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NOTES
ALIMONY MODIFICATION:
COHABITATION OF EX-WIFE WITH
ANOTHER MAN
Section 236 of the New York Domestic Relations Law empowers the court to order a husband to make alimony payments to his
wife to provide suitably for her support.' In determining whether
and to what extent to award alimony, the court considers such factors as the duration of the marriage, the ability of the wife to support herself, and the circumstances of the case and the respective
parties. 2 The same section includes a general provision for annul-3
party.
ment or modification of alimony upon application of either

Another section, section 248 of the Domestic Relations Law-the
central focus of this Note-additionally permits a husband to move
for termination of alimony if his wife remarries or "is habitually living with another man and 4holding herself out as his wife, although
not married to such man."
1. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney 1977). Unless otherwise indicated,
this Note is confined to the law of New York State.
The Supreme Court in Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979), invalidated an Alabama
statute providing alimony for wives only. Section 236 and other provisions of New
York law will have to be redrafted to comply with the decision.
This Note refers exclusively to alimony awards to women to reflect current New
York State law. Assuming the law is changed to provide alimony for men, and the
same standards are used for men and women in alimony determinations, a man will
not get alimony if his wife simply has more money, but only where he requires support. There will thus be fewer alimony awards to husbands than there are to wives.
Unlike women, men rarely forego careers to stay home and care for children, thereby
failing to develop marketable skills. It is also less likely that men will be awarded
custody of children upon divorce. Nor do men face the economic disadvantage of
earning less pay for the same job. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, alimony awards
should still be made to women. Nevertheless, references in this Note to "a woman"
receiving alimony are equally correct if read as "a dependent spouse."
2. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 248. The effect of Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979), on § 248 is not
clear. The legislature might make § 236 gender-free by providing for alimony for
men, but leave § 248 to allow alimony termination only for the husband if his wife is
cohabiting with another man. It could be argued that the statute addresses a different
471
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The New York Court of Appeals in Northrup v. Northrup5
denied an ex-husband's request to terminate alimony payments under section 248, even though Ms. Northrup was living with another man, because she was not "holding herself out" as his wife.6
Thus, habitual cohabitation alone does not satisfy the holding-out
requirement. Judge Wachtler, in his dissenting opinion, questioned whether the "Legislature ever intended such a grotesque
result." 7 Since few unmarried couples hold themselves out as married, Judge Wachtler expressed concern that courts are left "powerless to relieve the former husband of the obligation of subsidizing
his former wife's affairs." 8
The Northrup decision sparked moral outrage and debate over
the effectiveness of section 248. Editorial comment in the New
York Times found the decision "insupportable." 9 A letter to the
Times attacked the decision, expressing concern for "hard-working
men- who are caught in [a] humiliating and financially draining
trap."10 Within five days of the decision, Assemblyman Vincent
Nicolosi introduced legislation that would have eliminated the
holding-out requirement, permitting alimony to be terminated on
the basis of habitual cohabitation only. 1 A similar bill was passed
by the New York State Senate the following month.12
Proposals that are designed to strengthen section 248-such
as that of Assemblyman Nicolosi-are misdirected. A more sensible
issue than that presented in Orr, and as long as men can get alimony under § 236, §
248 can remain. Another possibility is redrafting § 248 to make it gender-neutral,
thus allowing an ex-wife paying alimony to have the award terminated if her exhusband is living with another woman. While this would appear the more reasonable
alternative as it avoids otherwise certain constitutional attack under the fourteenth
amendment, this Note will argue that § 248 should be abolished entirely, even if
gender-free.
5. 43 N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1978).
6. Id. at 572, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
7. Id. at 573, 373 N.E.2d at 1225, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (Wachtler, J.,dissenting).
8. Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
9. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1978, § 4, at 16, col. 1. This editorial considered
Northrup in conjunction with a California case that held that a woman can be
awarded alimony when she separates from a man to whom she is not married. Presumably the California case is Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134
Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
10. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1978, at 20, col. 6.
11. See A10394, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by N.Y.S. Assemblyman
Nicolosi); N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1978, at 27, col. 6.
12. S7144, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by N.Y.S. Sen. Gordon,
passed Senate Mar. 15, 1978).
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approach is to repeal section 248. The key consideration in alimony

of
modification should be a change in the financial circumstances
13
the parties. Section 236 provides for such modification. Furthermore, alimony modification should not be based on the moral considerations underlying section 248.
This Note examines section 248 in light of the Northrup deci-

sion and analyzes the legislative responses to Northrup. This dis-

cussion demonstrates that the problems associated with section 248
are indicative of the confusion surrounding the law of alimony and
alimony modification.
However, repeal of section 248 is only a partial solution. The

system must be overhauled to allow equal or at least equitable dis-

14
tribution of property after divorce. Courts should be permitted to

include periodic future payments in postdivorce property settlements. In certain cases the future earnings of a spouse should be

considered an asset of the marriage, divisible upon divorce. For ex-

ample, if a woman financed her husband's medical education, then

remained at home to care for their children instead of further developing marketable skills, and the marriage was of long duration,
she should have the right to share in her husband's future earnings. Even without major reform, however, repeal of section 248 is
a minimal step in the right direction.
THE

PROBLEM

Alimony in General

The confusion surrounding section 248 and the question

whether to eliminate a woman's alimony because she is living with
another man stems from confusion about the definition of alimony.
13. See, e.g., Covert v. Covert, 48 Misc. 2d 386, 264 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Sup. Ct.
1965). In determining whether to terminate alimony under § 236, the court "will
consider any significant changes in circumstances which materially increase or decrease the financial burden on either spouse." Id. at 388, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 822. If §
248 is made gender-neutral as a result of Orr, the thesis of this Note remains
to
unchanged. Since it is likely that substantially more alimony awards will be made
women than men, the negative effects of § 248 will have a disproportionate effect on
rewomen. Furthermore, even if some men are affected, the defects in the statute
main. In the few cases where men are awarded alimony, it should be modified only
on a
on a showing of substantial change of financial circumstances and not simply
is
showing that the man is living with another woman. California's version of § 248
accompatext
see
1978);
Supp.
Gum.
(West
4801.5
§
gender-neutral. CAL. CIV. CODE
nying notes 140-144 infra.
14. See note 39 infra and accompanying text.
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Alimony is a statutory creation. 15 The statute governing alimony
awards in New York State is necessarily broad to cover the many

possible circumstances that can occur in the event of divorce.

Consequently, alimony determinations are made within such vague
statutory parameters as "the court's discretion" and "as . . . justice
16

requires.'

One commentator has noted, "The direct result of

[the] conspicuous absence of guidelines to the exercise of judicial
discretion is an extraordinarily wide variety of judicial behavior." 17
The statute has been subject to a broad range of judicial interpreta-

tions stemming from different views about the nature, purposes,

and functions of alimony.18 Alimony may be awarded to provide

support for the ex-wife; it may be withheld to punish her; it often
has characteristics of child support or a property settlement; and it

may have a different meaning when included in a separation agreement.19
15. Weintraub v. Weintraub, 302 N.Y. 104, 108, 96 N.E.2d 724,
727 (1951);
Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 18, 47 N.E.2d 423, 425 (1943); Leitman
v. Leitman,
21 Misc. 2d 653, 655, 190 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
9 A.D.2d 682, 192
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1950).
16. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney 1977).
17. MacDonald, The Alimony Blues, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1975, §
6
at 20, col. 1, 34, col. 4. Section 236 does contain minimal guidelines: (Magazine),
It directs the
court to consider the duration of the marriage, the ability of the
wife
supporting, and the circumstances of the case and of the respective to be selfparties. N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977).
18. See, e.g., McMains v. McMains, 15 N.Y.2d 283, 288, 206 N.E.2d
185, 189,
258 N.Y.S.2d 93, 99 (1965) ("A wife is not entitled to a share of
her husband's income as such nor is there a right to escalation as the husband prospers
but she must
have minimum support."); Phillips v. Phillips, 1 A.D.2d 393, 150 N.Y.S.2d
646, aff'd,
2 N.Y.2d 742, 138 N.E.2d 738, 157 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1956): "[S]ociety
demanded that
even a divorced wife should be appropriately maintained by her
ex-husband so that
she would not become a charge on the community. Hence, alimony
was created as a
statutory substitute for the marital right of support." Id. at 395, 150
N.Y.S.2d at 649;
Faversham v. Faversham, 161 A.D. 521, 146 N.Y.S. 569 (1914): "The
right to receive
alimony . . .is clearly a personal right, arising out of the domestic
relations, and is
not a property right." Id. at 524, 146 N.Y.S. at 571; Doyle v. Doyle,
5 Misc. 2d 4, 158
N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1957): "A practical approach in awarding alimony
would be to
proceed on the basis of what we may term 'net need,' the wife's actual
financial requisite less her current assets and earning potential in relation to her
husband's capacity to pay." Id. at 7, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
19. A husband often agrees to pay alimony in a separation agreement.
A separation agreement constitutes a ground for divorce if the parties have
lived apart pursuant to the agreement for at least one year after it was executed
and the plaintiff
proves that he or she has substantially performed all the terms and
conditions of the
agreement. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney 1977). A
support obligation
created in a separation agreement need not be based on judicial or
statutory reasons
for awarding alimony. See id. The intent of the parties at the time
of the separation
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Courts often grant alimony to provide a means of support for
the wife, a purpose included in section 236.20 "Societal impact" is
often a consideration: "The obligation is better placed on one of the
former spouses than upon the state through public assistance or
some other mechanism." 2' However, postdivorce support often is

not considered a right 22 and is awarded in only a small percentage
of cases: 2 3 "A 1975 survey shows that only one divorc6e in every

seven is awarded alimony, and less than one in two is granted financial support for the children. Moreover, less than half of the

payments arrive regularly,
with compliance dwindling almost to
24
pass."
years
the
zero as
Judges increasingly expect a divorced woman who has never

worked outside the home to get a job.2 5 According to one court, a
woman "is now the equal of man, socially, politically and economically." 26 However, economic equality has not been achieved: The
average salary of a working woman is fifty-seven percent that of a
working man and the unemployment rate among women is higher
than among men.2 7 Older homemakers who have not acquired

marketable skills are in the most difficult position. 28

or divorce decree determines whether the separation agreement survives the divorce
decree or is merged into it. E. BISKIND, BOARDMAN'S NEW YORK FAMILY LAW § 138
(1972). If the agreement is merged into the divorce decree, it is modifiable under §§
236 and 248; if it survives the divorce decree, its terms are enforceable as contractual
obligations, even if the court later reduces the support payment awarded in the court
order. H. FOSTER & D.J. FREED, LAW AND THE FAMiLY 55-56 (Supp. 1973). The
court will only change a support obligation created in a separation agreement that
survives the divorce decree for "compelling circumstances," such as emergency
medical expenses or if the wife is in danger of becoming a public charge. Id. at 55.
Section 248 has been held inapplicable to separation agreements that survive the divorce decree. Goldberg v. Goldberg, 54 A.D.2d 837, 388 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1976) (mem.);
Hirschfield v. Hirschfield, 54 A.D.2d 656, 388 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1976) (mem.).
20. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977).
21. W. NVADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DoMESTIC RELATIONS 481 (3d ed. 1978).
22. See McMains v. McMains, 15 N.Y.2d 283, 206 N.E.2d 185, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93
(1965).
23. R.T. EISLER, DISSOLUTION 46 (1977) (citing CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND ALIMONY AND
CHILD SUPPORT LAWS (1972)).

24. Lake, Divorcees: The New Poor, MCCALL'S, Sept. 1976, at 18, 18.
25. Id.
26. Doyle v. Doyle, 5 Misc. 2d 4, 6, 158 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
27. Lake, supra note 24, at 18.
28. But see Kay v. Kay, 37 N.Y.2d 632, 638, 339 N.E.2d 143, 147, 376 N.Y.S.2d
443, 448 (1975) (financial position of older homemaker, who lacked marketable skills,
a factor in determining alimony award).
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Alimony is often viewed as a derivation from the common law
obligation of a husband to support his wife in return for her services. 2 9 However, this basis for alimony contains a logical inconsistency: It could justify obliteration of alimony in all cases, since a di30
vorced wife no longer provides services for her husband.
Providing alimony to an ex-wife who is "serving" another man
seems particularly egregious to those who view alimony as compen31
sation for present services.
Despite the concept of alimony as support, it may be denied
regardless of the ex-wife's financial needs if she is found guilty of
misconduct constituting grounds for divorce.3 2 Withholding alimony under these circumstances functions as punishment to promote behavior the legislature deems moral. Similarly, a section 248
modification of an alimony award is a punishment for "misconduct," since the wife's financial needs are not considered.
Although alimony is, in theory, for support of the wife,3 3 it is
often substituted for child support. Because alimony payments are
tax deductible by the husband and child support is not,3 4 wives often agree to label child-support payments alimony in separation
agreements.3 5 By reducing the husband's tax liability, this agreement may result in an increase in payments to the wife. 3 6 How37
ever, unlike child support, alimony is taxable income to the wife.
Although the child-support characteristics of alimony are particularly applicable to support obligations created in separation agreements, they are also relevant to court-ordered alimony: It is not
uncommon for an ex-wife attempting to enforce court-ordered support to find that "a carefully worded divorce decree from Supreme
29. Phillips v. Phillips, 1 A.D.2d 393, 150 N.Y.S.2d 646, aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d
742, 138 N.E.2d 738, 157 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1956); Averett v. Averett, 110 Misc. 584, 181
N.Y.S. 645 (Sup. Ct. 1920).

30. Alimony should be considered support for past services, especially if providing services to the husband precluded the wife from developing marketable
skills. However, courts have not adopted this view. See text accompanying notes 42
& 43 infra.
31. See, e.g., Northrup v. Northrup, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 572, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 1224,
402 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
32. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977); Aleszczyk v. Aleszczyk, 55
A.D.2d 840, 390 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1976) (mem.); Mammon v. Mammon, 54 A.D.2d 762,
387 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1976) (mem.).
33. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977).
34. I.R.C. § 215.
35. See note 19 supra.
36. See R.T. EISLER, supra note 23, at 46.
37. I.R.C. § 71.
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Court stating $80 per week of which $20 is alimony and $60 is
child support may be and often is reduced by Family Court to a total of $30 per week-all of which is alimony,"38 taxable to the exwife and modifiable under section 248. In addition, some payments
properly considered alimony have characteristics of child support
for women who would not need the payments if they had no children. A wife and her husband may have agreed that she should
take care of the children instead of working outside the home, or
she may not be able to afford to work due to the high cost of child
care. Yet, even alimony with characteristics of child support can be
terminated under section 248.
Alimony often has characteristics of a property settlement in
common law property states, such as New York, where property
cannot be transferred from the person who holds legal title. 39 De38. Letter from Gail Brown to Mr. Fusco, Family Court, Nassau County, reprintedin Focus Newsletter 4 (Sept.-Oct. 1978) (emphasis in original).
39. Foster & Freed, Alimony: "Dum Casta" and Smart Women, Part II,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1. "Under existing New York law, upon divorce
each party ordinarily retains his or her separately held property but there is a division of that which is subject to joint ownership." H. FOSTER & D.J. FREED, supra
note 19, at 52 (footnote omitted). "[A] fetish is made out of how title is held, which
may be purely a fortuitous matter or a design resulting from cupidity, and no credit
may be given for the wife's contributions to the household and family." Id. at 52-53
(footnote omitted). "As a practical matter, it may be more difficult for a wife to assert
an equitable interest in property held in the name of the husband, than it is for the
latter to establish equitable title to property held in the wife's name. This is because
it is common for husbands to place property in the wife's name. To some extent, this
operational inequity is offset by the propensity that a 'gift' was made to the wife, but
the law in this regard is far from certain." Id. at 52 (footnote omitted). N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1977) empowers the court to award possession of property to the spouse who does Aot hold legal title and to settle disputes about ownership of property. To remedy unjust enrichment, a court may find that the spouse who
has legal title holds the property in a constructive trust for the other spouse. See
Janke v. Janke, 47 A.D.2d 445, 366 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1975), aff'd mem., 39 N.Y.2d 786,
350 N.E.2d 617, 385 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1976). But see Wirth v. Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 326
N.Y.S.2d 308 (1971) (mem.) (although wife spent her salary on family expenses and
husband accumulated his earnings in his name, court refused to find constructive
trust of real and personal property held by husband for wife). A separation agreement can equitably distribute property without regard to who holds legal title. See
note 19 supra. Legislation has been introduced in the New York State Legislature
during the last few years to change § 236 to provide for an equitable postdivorce distribution of marital property. One such bill was introduced by Assemblymen Burrows, Cooperman, and Fink in 1978. A12525, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978). The legislation was stalled by some legislators over the issue of retroactivity. Foster &
Freed, Family Law, 29 SYBACUSE L. REv. 569 (1978). A 1979 bill for equitable distribution, A6200, 202d N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1979), was passed by the Assembly on June
13, 1979. New York State NOW opposed the bill as written. The Assembly passed a
second bill the same day, A8211, 202d N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1979), offered as a chapter
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spite the statutory mandate that alimony is for support,4 ° some
courts construct alimony awards to reflect the large property holdings retained by the husband. 41 However, unlike property settlements, alimony is modifiable under sections 236 and 248. The punishment inflicted by section 248 for the wife's conduct after divorce
is particularly indefensible when alimony awards have characteristics of property settlements.
Although alimony encompasses many different concepts, it is
generally not considered "restitution for years of unpaid productive
labor," 42 nor is it treated as something to which a wife is entitled.
"Alimony has traditionally been considered little more than a charitable obligation of a good-hearted husband." 43 Despite language
acknowledging the contributions of the homemaker to the marriage, judges and legislators still seem to assume that the money
belonged to the husband during the marriage and remains his after
divorce. This explains the concern engendered by a husband giving
his money to an ex-wife living with another man.
Section 248
Because there is less social stigma attached to sexual relations
between unmarried persons today than in the past, the likelihood
of a divorced woman living with a man who is not her husband is
increasing. This increase has produced a counterreaction, a "revival
of interest in a device from the deep, fault-oriented past: the dum
casta clause." 44 This clause allows only chaste ex-wives to receive
amendment by Assemblywoman May Newburger. Of the two bills, A8211 is the
more acceptable to NOW, because it includes equitable distribution of property with
a presumption of equality. No action had been taken on the bills by the Senate as of
the 1979 spring legislative recess.
40. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney 1977).

41. Foster & Freed, Alimony: "Dum Casta" and Smart Women, Part II,
N.Y.LJ., Jan. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1, 2, col. 1 (footnotes omitted).

[I]n New York due to the common law property-rules, which discriminate
against wives, alimony may serve the purpose of making up for the deficiencies of our marital property law.

To the extent that alimony may be used to effect an equitable distribution of resources, it partakes of property settlement as distinguished from
support ....

Id.
42. Lake, supra note 24, at 22.
43. Id.

44. Wadlington, Sexual Relations After Separation or Divorce: The New Morality and the Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L. REV. 249, 265 (1977) (footnote
omitted).
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payments. Statutes such as section 248 represent "modified ver45
sions of dum casta clauses."
Section 248 provides:
The court in its discretion upon application of the husband on
notice, upon proof that the wife is habitually living with another
man and holding herself out as his wife, although not married to
such man, may modify such final judgment [of divorce or annulment, or declaring the nullity of a void marriage] and any orders
made with respect thereto by annulling the provisions of such fiboth, directing payment of money
nal judgment or orders or of
46
for the support of such wife.
Section 248 also provides for termination of court-ordered support if the ex-wife remarries. 47 Supporters of this basis for alimony
termination deem it logical also to terminate support when the exwife lives with another man and holds herself out as his wife: They
consider this a "remarriage" in every sense other than that no marriage ceremony has been performed. 48 Alimony is eliminated,
rather than merely suspended or reduced, if the ex-wife actually
remarries or if she habitually cohabits with another man and holds
herself out as his wife. 49 However, there are crucial distinctions
between actual remarriage and the holding-out situation: Although
a husband has a duty to support his wife, 5 0 a man has no obligation
45. Foster & Freed, Alimony: "Dum Casta" and Smart Women, Part I,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1976, at 1, col. 1,2,col. 1.
46. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1977) (emphasis added).
47. Id. Termination of alimony when the wife remarries was not required by
statute in New York until 1904. Act of Apr. 16, 1904, ch. 339, 1904 N.Y. Laws 885. A
separation agreement may provide for continuation of alimony after the wife
remarries.
48. See Levine v. Levine, 79 Misc. 2d 149, 151, 359 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (mem.). Common law marriage has not been recognized in New York State
since 1933. W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, supra note 21, at 130.
49. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 248 (McKinney 1977). At the time the lower court
eliminated alimony in Northrup, Ms. Northrup was no longer living with another
man. However, the court did not restrict its order eliminating alimony to the period
of cohabitation; rather it eliminated alimony entirely. Northrup v. Northrup, No.
12291174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1974) (mem:), aff'd, 52 A.D.2d 1093, 384 N.Y.S.2d
319 (1976), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1978). See text
accompanying notes 84-98 infra. But see Hall v. Hall, 82 Misc. 2d 814, 372 N.Y.S.2d
344 (Fain. Ct. 1975), aff'd mem., 55 A.D.2d 752, 389 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976) (section 248
applied and alimony reduced, but not eliminated).
50. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 32 (McKinney 1977). A wife may be liable for her
husband's support only if he is likely to become a public charge. Id. See also N.Y.
FAm. CT. ACT §§ 412, 415 (McKinney 1975); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311
(McKinney 1978).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

9

7: 471
HOFSTRA
LAW
REVIEW
Hofstra
Law
Review,
Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1979], [Vol.
Art. 10

to support a woman with whom he is living, 5 1 nor does she have
the right to his social security 52 and pension benefits or to elect the
spousal share under his will. 5 3 Thus, the financial hardships created by alimony termination are greater for the woman who cohabits with another man than for the woman who remarries.
There is considerable confusion about the purpose of section
54
248. Most courts adopt the view, expressed in Levine v. Levine,
that section 248 reflects a public-policy opposition to "double support."5 5 Most courts find double support when the ex-wife receives
support from both her ex-husband and the man with whom she is
living. 5 6 And at least one court has applied section 248 when the
former husband's alimony payments were used to support the
57
former wife and another man.
However, on its face, section 248 is not limited to double support cases: The ex-husband is not required to prove that his ex-wife
is either receiving support from or supporting the man with whom
she is living. Financial need is not even a relevant inquiry under
the statute. Furthermore, a recipient of alimony payments could
receive additional funds from such other sources as a parent, a job,
or another woman without invoking section 248.58 The exclusion of
these forms of double support from section 248 indicates, at least,
that avoiding double support was not the sole legislative motivation
for enacting section 248. In effect, the statute punishes women for
engaging in activity deemed immoral by legislators. This results in
substantial injustice to the ex-wife whose alimony is terminated because she is living with another man if the man with whom she is
living is not contributing to her financial support or being supported by her. 59
51. But see Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976) (unmarried couple can make express or implied contract resulting in division
of property and support obligation when relationship terminates).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976).
53. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967 & Cum. Supp.
1978).
54. 79 Misc. 2d 149, 359 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (mem.).
55. Id. at 151, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 745. See also Leffler v. Leffler, 50 A.D.2d 93, 96,

376 N.Y.S.2d 176, 179 (1975) (Nunez, J., dissenting), aff'd mem., 40 N.Y.2d 1036, 360
N.E.2d 355, 391 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1976); Krawczuk v. Krawczuk, 49 A.D.2d 1003, 1004,
374 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (1975).

56. See cases cited note 55 supra.
57. Hall v. Hall, 82 Misc. 2d 814, 816, 372 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (Fam. Ct. 1975),
aff'd mem., 55 A.D.2d 752, 389 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976).

58. See Kenney v. Kenney, 76 Misc. 2d 927, 352 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
(section 248 held inapplicable when ex-wife is living with another woman and holding herself out as married, because wording of statute refers only to "another man").
59. However, the judge is not required to terminate alimony under § 248; it is
a discretionary decision. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1977).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss2/10

10

1979]

ALIMONY
MODIFICATION
Komitor: Alimony
Modification:
Cohabitation of Ex-Wife with Another Man

Even if preventing double support is the rationale underlying
section 248, the statute is superfluous. Section 236 allows alimony
modification if there is a substantial change in circumstances. Thus,
Judge Wachtler's concern for the ex-husband who has the "obligation of subsidizing his former wife's affairs no matter how unfair
this may be under the circumstances" 60 is misplaced: An ex-husband in this position can seek a remedy under section 236. Concern instead should be directed to the ex-wife whose alimony is
terminated when she is living with another man who is neither substantially contributing to her support nor being supported by her.
In addition, the statute results in inconsistent treatment, because it has been held inapplicable to separation agreements incorporated but not merged into divorce decrees. 61 It has been noted
that "[if the situation contemplated by present section 248 involves an assumed affront to public decency, how can it be that the
husband may waive it by contract? Should not such a contract be
deemed to be against public policy? ' 62 Thus, lower income women
who cannot afford separation agreements are particularly harmed
by application of section 248, even though their financial needs are
63
the most substantial.
Although a divorced woman may lose alimony payments because she cohabits with another man and holds herself out as his
wife, a divorced man is not subject to an increase in alimony payments for cohabiting with another woman. Thus, critics of section
248 have argued: "Most courts as yet have not reached the point of
view that a former wife is entitled to privacy, autonomy, and sexual
fulfllment outside of matrimony. . . . [T]he practical effect of section 248 is to impose a chastity belt on the wife where none is
64
imposed on the former husband."
Despite the many problems with section 248, the issue which
has presented most difficulty for courts is the meaning of the
holding-out provision. Prior to the New York Court of Appeals decision in Northrup, the confusion surrounding the purpose of section 248 led to different judicial approaches to the statute, particularly its holding-out requirement.
60.

N.Y.S.2d
61.
N.Y.L.J.,
62.
N.Y.L.J.,
63.
64.

Northrup v. Northrup, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 573, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 1225, 402

997, 1001 (1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
See Foster & Freed, Alimony: "Dum Casta" and Smart Women, Part II,
Jan. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1. See also note 19 supra.
Foster & Freed, Alimony: "Dum Casta" and Smart Women, Part II,
Jan. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1, 2, col. 2.
Id.
Id. at 2, col. 3 (footnote omitted).
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and the Supreme Court Appellate Division66
The trial
in Northrup found that a couple can hold itself out as husband and
wife without statements or representations to third parties. Other
courts had required representations to third parties, such as bank
67
accounts or charge accounts in the "married" name.
In Stern v. Stern, 68 the ex-wife had been living with a man for
one year. Their apartment lease was in their individual names;
they had two separate telephones, one in his name and one in
hers; they had separate checking accounts; and each paid the bills
for his or her own purchases. The only evidence of "holding out"
was that on two occasions they registered at hotels as Mr. and Mrs.
Rowen; however, they claimed they did not request to be registered in this manner, nor did they indicate a marital relationship
on the registration card. The court found that the parties had been
"meticulous in avoiding a public holding out of themselves as husband and wife,"69 and refused to eliminate alimony under section
248 or section 236. The court maintained that in enacting section
248 the legislature did not intend that alimony be discontinued
merely because the former wife is "habitually living with another
man, but only when there [exists] the combination of such living
together and the holding out as his wife, so as to constitute a relationship similar to what formerly was an element of a common-law
70
marriage."
In In re Anonymous, 71 a couple lived, ate, socialized, and
went on trips together. The court, influenced by the appellate division decision in Northrup,72 found that their lifestyle "would lead a
reasonable person to believe that they were living in a marital relacourt6 5

tionship," 73 and held that the holding-out requirement was
65. Northrup v. Northrup, No. 12291/74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1974) (mem.),
affd, 52 A.D.2d 1093, 384 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1976), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d
1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1978).
66. Northrup v. Northrup, 52 A.D.2d 1093, 384 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1976), rev'd, 43
N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1978).
67. See Citron v. Citron, 91 Misc. 2d 785, 398 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Stern v. Stern, 88 Misc. 2d 860, 389 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
68. 88 Misc. 2d 860, 389 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
69. Id. at 862, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
70. Id. at 863, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
71. 90 Misc. 2d 801, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Fam. Ct. 1977).
72. See id. at 803, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (citing Northrup v. Northrup, 52 A.D.2d
1093, 384 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1976), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d
997 (1978)).
73. Id. at 804, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
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satisfied. The court distinguished Stern by asserting that Stern did
not find holding out because the parties went to great lengths to
inform the world that they were not husband and wife.7 4 The court
in In re Anonymous nevertheless denied the husband's requested
relief because the support obligation was created in a separation
agreement not merged in the divorce judgment and section 248
does not apply to such agreements. 75 The court added that even if
section 248 does apply to separation agreements, it would not exercise its discretion to eliminate alimony because the husband was
aware of his wife's living arrangements at the time of the agree76
ment.
Financial circumstances were determinative in Krawczuk v.
Krawczuk. 7 7 Although the ex-wife had been living with another
man for nine months, the court did not terminate alimony, because
the ex-wife's sole source of income was the court-ordered payments. This constitutes an "uncontroverted showing . . . that the
wife was not receiving 'double support.' "78
In Hall v. Hall,79 the court held that section 248 is applicable
when the ex-wife receives additional financial support from the
man with whom she is living and when she and the other man are
living on the ex-husband's alimony payments; the court modified
the alimony obligation on the latter ground.8 0 Although section 248
provides only for elimination of alimony, the court reduced payments based on the "grant of discretion in this portion of section
248, together with the general legislative policy embodied in section 236."81
NORTHRUP V. NORTHRUP

Facts
Anna and Ray Northrup were married for twenty-four years
and had four children. On March 7, 1974, Ms. Northrup was
74.

Id. at 804, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.

75. 90 Misc. 2d at 809, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 1006. See note 19 supra; text accompanying note 61 supra.
76. In re Anonymous, 90 Misc. 2d 801, 811, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1007 (Fam. Ct.
1977).
77. 49 A.D.2d 1003, 374 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1975).
78. Id. at 1004, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
79. 82 Misc. 2d 814, 372 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Fam. Ct. 1975), affd mem., 55 A.D.2d
752, 389 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976).
80. Id. at 816, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
81. Id. at 817, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
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granted a divorce from Mr. Northrup by the Supreme Court in
Monroe County on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment.8 2 The
decree awarded her custody of the two minor children, $160 per
month alimony payments, and $500 for counsel fees.83
At the time of the divorce, Ms. Northrup was employed and
earned $80 per week. She was living with relatives. After the divorce, Mr. Northrup remarried and Ms. Northrup moved into an
apartment with Mr. Prentice, where she resided until September
19, 1974. Mr. Northrup made two $160 payments and then refused
to make further payments.
84

Trial Court
Ms. Northrup moved for a contempt citation against Mr.
Northrup for failure to comply with a court order. Mr. Northrup
brought a crossclaim to eliminate the alimony provision from the
divorce decree under section 248 "on the grounds that plaintiff was
habitually living with a man not her husband and holding herself
out to be his wife."' 5
Justice Mastrella of the Supreme Court in Monroe County
granted Mr. Northrup's motion to modify the divorce decree to
eliminate alimony effective when the plaintiff was served in the action. The court also ordered Mr. Northrup to pay alimony up to
the date of service and to pay $300 for counsel fees. 86
The court found that, since Ms. Northrup "lived with Mr.
Prentice, shared the same bedroom with him, cooked his meals,
did his wash, permitted him to use her car, and shared the household expenses with him,"87 the habitual-cohabitation requirement
in section 248 was satisfied. The only remaining issue was whether
Ms. Northrup and Mr. Prentice were holding themselves out as
husband and wife. 88 The court noted that since the enactment of
section 248, society's disfavor of a woman living with a man not

82. Northrup v. Northrup, Judgment of Divorce, No. 7919/73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 7, 1974). See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 170(1) (McKinney 1977).
83.

Northrup v. Northrup, Judgment of Divorce, No. 7919/73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

Mar. 7, 1974).
84. Northrup v. Northrup, No. 12291/74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1974) (mem.),
aff'd, 52 A.D.2d 1093, 384 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1976), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d
1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1978).
85. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id. at 2-3.
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her husband has been replaced by a general attitude of acceptance.

89

Justice Mastrella asserted that requiring statements or representations of holding out would nullify section 248, since few
unmarried couples living together today hold themselves out as
husband and wife. He therefore construed the holding-out requirement to mean "conduct which would lead a person to believe that
the parties are living and associating as husband and wife." 90 Since
such conduct was found to be present, the court eliminated alimony. 9 1
The court further asserted that during the time Ms. Northrup
was living with Mr. Prentice, she "had all the rights and privileges
and opportunities of a wife and he those of a husband." 9 2 However, Prentice did not have the legal obligation to support her, 93
nor did she have the right to his social security and pension bene94
fits or the right to elect the spousal share under his will.
Appellate Division

95

Seventeen months after the initial ruling, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department
unanimously affirmed the decision of the lower court, 9 6 holding
that section 248 "does not require the husband to prove that his
former wife made affirmative representations to third parties that
she and her paramour were married. The fact that they lived together in what might reasonably be considered a marital relationship is sufficient." 97 The court justified its holding with the observation that "[w]ith the exception of occasional food purchases, he
paid all the bills. '"98 However, this is inconsistent with the trial
court's finding that Mg. Northrup and Mr. Prentice shared household expenses.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
See note 51 supra.

94.

See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1

(MeKinney 1967 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
95. Northrup v. Northrup, 52 A.D.2d 1093, 384 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1976), rev'd, 43
N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1978).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1093, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
98. Id. at 1093, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
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Court of Appeals9"
Ms. Northrup argued before the New York Court of Appeals
that the legislative history of section 248 indicates that the legislature was concerned with "hypocrisy rather than extra-marital, postmarital intimacy."' 100 Thus, she asserted that the legislative intent,
as well as the plain meaning of the statute, justify distinguishing
the statute's habitual-cohabitation element from its holding-out element. 10 1 Petitioner accused the lower courts of assuming a legislative function, arguing that if section 248 is an anachronism, it
02
should be changed by the legislature, not by the courts. 1
Respondent argued that the lower court's decision should be
aflirmed, since only factual issues are presented. He asserted that
the statutory distinction between cohabitation and holding out is
illusory because "[tihe judicial interpretation of the term 'cohabitation' clearly defines it as meaning the living together of a couple as
husband and wife."' 03 He also claimed that Ms. Northrup was
receiving double support, which violates public policy and justifies
alimony modification under section 248.104
Mr. Northrup did not raise the issue of alimony modification
under section 236. His counsel maintained that this was a deliberate strategy decision, because section 248 provides only for alimony
termination, whereas section 236 allows reduction or suspension of
05
alimony.'
The court of appeals' majority decision, written by Judge
Cooke, reversed the appellate division. The court found that the issue is "purely one of statutory construction," 10 6 and held that section 248 establishes a two-part test: habitual cohabitation and the
former wife holding herself out as married to the man with whom
she is living. 10 7 The court explicitly rejected the argument that the

simple fact of a couple living together constitutes a holding out.' 08
99. Northrup v. Northrup, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997

(1978).
100.

Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 5.

101. Id. at 7.
102. Id.
103. Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 5.
104. Id. at 6-7.
105. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 236, 248 (McKinney 1977). Telephone interview
with George A. Schell, Attorney for the Defendant (Oct. 12, 1978).
106. Northrup v. Northrup, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 570, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 1223, 402
N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (1978).
107. Id. at 571-72, 373 N.E.2d at 1223-24, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000.
108. Id. at 571, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (citing In re Anonymous, 90 Misc. 2d 801, 804, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (Fam. Ct. 1977)).
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Thus, evidence that plaintiff lived with a man for six months was
not sufficient.
The decision provides some guidelines for determining if the
holding-out requirement is satisfied. Statements by the woman that
she is the wife of the person with whom she is living might constitute a holding out, but are not necessary. 10 9 Conduct of the
former wife that could constitute a holding out includes: "applying
for a telephone, designating [the man with whom she lives] as her
spouse and asking that she be listed in the directory with his surname; and ... changing the names on their joint checking account

so that she uses his surname." 110
It was on the basis of these criteria that Judge Wachtler asserted in his dissenting opinion that since unmarried couples rarely
hold themselves out as married, the majority virtually nullified the
statute: "Today's decision leaves the courts powerless to relieve the
former husband of the obligation of subsidizing his former wife's affairs no matter how unfair this may be under the circumstances. It
is hard to imagine that the Legislature ever intended such a grotesque result.""'
HISTORY OF SECTION 248

An examination of the legislative history of section 248 aids in
analyzing the holding-out requirement and in ascertaining the purposes of the legislation. The history clearly supports the view of
the court of appeals in Northrup that holding out and habitual cohabitation are distinct elements of section 248. However, the legislative intent regarding the purpose of the statute is difficult to determine.
Modification of a support order made upon divorce was possible in New York as early as 1895. The law provided that, upon dissolution of a marriage, the court could order the defendant to make
support payments to the wife and "may, by order, upon the application of either party to the action, and after due notice to the
other, to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, at
any time after final judgment, vary or modify such a direction.""12
Since 1904, alimony has been subject to termination if the wife
109.
110.
(1975)).
111.
senting).
112.

Id. at 571, 373 N.E.2d at 1223, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
Id. (citing Lang v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 3d 852, 126 Cal. Rptr. 122
Id. at 573, 373 N.E.2d at 1225, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (Wachtler, J., disAct of June 4, 1895, ch. 891, 1895 N.Y. Laws 720, at 721.
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remarries.1i 3 Section 236, enacted in 1962,114 was intended by the
legislature to expand the court's discretionary power to modify an
alimony award. The Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on
Matrimonial and Family Laws stated that proposed section 236
11 5
"unifies and broadens the discretion of the court."
There was no provision for modification based on the wife's
misconduct until section 248 was enacted in 1938, although there
was a general provision for alimony modification prior to that date.
Thus, in 1917, the court in Hayes v. Hayes1 6 held that the former
wife's conduct after divorce does not justify eliminating alimony
1
payments. i 7
Section 248118 "came about as a direct result of an actual case
[Waddey v. Waddey "i 9] and was, in fact, enacted largely through the
efforts of a lawyer for one of the parties involved."' i 20 In 1928,
Ethel and Everett Waddey, Jr., were divorced. Later, Ms.
Waddey began to live with another man and hold herself out as his
wife in a relationship that at one time would have been considered
a common law marriage.12 Because of the Hayes decision, where
the court held that a wife's misconduct is not a ground for alimony
modification,12 2 Mr. Waddey was unsuccessful in his attempt to
have alimony terminated. Through the efforts of Mr. Waddey's attorney, a bill was introduced in the 1937 legislative session by Assemblyman E.F. Moran which would have permitted termination of
alimony " 'upon proof that the wife is living with another man and
holding herself out as his wife and receiving support for him al-

113.
114.

Act of Apr. 16, 1904, ch. 339, 1904 N.Y. Laws 885.
Act of Apr. 4, 1962, ch. 313, 1962 N.Y. Laws 2026, at 2045,

115.

N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 34, 185th N.Y. Legis. Sess. 309 (1962), quoted in

McMains v. McMains, 15 N.Y.2d 283, 289, 206 N.E.2d 185, 189, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93, 99

(1965). See also In re Anonymous, 90 Misc. 2d 801, 809, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1006
(Fain. Ct. 1977); Hall v. Hall, 82 Misc. 2d 814, 816, 372 N.Y.S.2d 344, 347 (Fam. Ct.
1975), aff'd mem., 55 A.D.2d 752, 389 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976).
116. 220 N.Y. 596, 115 N.E. 1040 (1917) (mem.).
117. Id.
118. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1977) (originally enacted as Act of

Mar. 26, 1938, ch. 161, 1938 N.Y. Laws 682 (originally codified at N.Y. CIV. PAC.
AcT § 1159 (1938))).
119. 290 N.Y. 251, 49 N.E. 8 (1943).
120. Citron v. Citron, 91 Misc. 2d 785, 789, 398 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (referring to Mr. Waddey's attorney in Waddey v. Waddey, 290 N.Y. 251, 49
N.E. 8 (1943)).
121. Id. at 789, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 626; see note 48 supra.
122. Hayes v. Hayes, 220 N.Y. 596, 115 N.E. 1040 (1917). See text accompanying notes 116 & 117 supra.
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though not married to such man.' "123 The final version, passed in
the 1938 session, left out the requirement that the wife receive
support from the man with whom she is living and added the requirement that the cohabitation be habitual. This indicates that the
legislature deliberately omitted financial considerations from section 248.
The court in Citron v. Citron 1 24 asserted that the legislation
was "not aimed solely at immorality,"1 25 but was designed to
remedy situations like that in Waddey v. Waddey, where holding
out is present.1 2 6 According to the court in Citron, the law was not
"prompted by a hypothetical moral outrage on the part of the legislators, nor was it prompted by a desire to put an end to a widespread 'racket' whereby an ex-wife would use alimony to support a
127
new lover.'
As indicated in Citron, some confusion about the actual intent
of the legislature in enacting section 248 may result from a letter
written by Assemblyman Moran to Governor Lehman on March
28
24, 1938, in support of the bill:'
This bill overcomes a racket wherein "A", a beautiful young
blond, married "B", rich, old fool and so conducts herself so that
within three months "B" is most anxious and very agreeable to a
divorce and the payment of $200.00 weekly alimony. "A" who is
very fond of "C" also young, wants to marry him but realizes
that marriage will deprive her of the $200.00 per week. Instead
of marrying "C", she lives with him habitually as Mrs. "C", and
holds herself out as such. Thus both "A" and "C"
live happily
29
everafter on "B" 's $200 per week. It is not fair.'
This letter demonstrates that the Citron court is correct in its view
that the legislature intended a separate holding-out requirement.1 30 However, the letter also demonstrates, by its colorful lan123. Citron v. Citron, 91 Misc. 2d 785, 790, 398 N.Y.S.2d 624, 627 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (emphasis added) (quoting A.P. 2803, Int. 2344, 160th N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1937)
(sponsored by Assemblyman Moran)).
124. 91 Misc. 2d 785, 398 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
125. Id. at 790, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
126. Id. at 789, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 790, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
129. Letter from Assemblyman E.F. Moran to Governor Herbert Lehman (Mar.
24, 1938) (emphasis added), quoted in Citron v. Citron, 91 Misc. 2d at 791, 398
N.Y.S.2d at 627.
130. See Stern v. Stern, 88 Misc. 2d 860, 863, 389 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268 (Sup. Ct.
1976).
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guage, that Moran's concern goes beyond the problem of double
support; he is also concerned with what he considers the immorality of the situation.
The letter, which brings to mind the Wachtler dissent in
Northrup,' 3 ' illustrates the common tendency of courts and legislators to approach these problems from a male point of view. While
Moran considers the situation in his hypothetical unfair, he neglects to point out that it is at least as unfair to withhold alimony
from a woman who is merely living with, but not being supported
by, another man.' 32 The emphasis is incorrectly placed on the
wife's "immoral" conduct, rather than on changes in the parties' financial circumstances. Furthermore, section 248 was enacted before section 236, which expanded the court's discretionary power to
modify an alimony award.133 Had section 236 been enacted prior to
consideration of section 248, section 248 might well have been considered unnecessary and never have been passed.134
The legislative history of section 248 indicates that the court in
Northrup correctly interpreted the statute. However, the increasing
number of divorced women living with other men and not holding themselves out as wives has led many legislators to conclude
that the statute has become meaningless; thus a number of reform
proposals have been suggested.
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES

ProposalTo Eliminate the Holding-Out Provision
Several legislators have proposed bills which eliminate the
statutory words "and holding herself out as his wife"; these proposals permit elimination of alimony upon a mere showing that an exwife is habitually living with another man. Assemblymen Nicolosi
and Hevesi introduced such bills in the Assembly,' 35 and Senators
131.

43 N.Y.2d 566, 572, 573 N.E.2d 1221, 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (1978)

(Wachtler, J., dissenting).

132. It is questionable whether a court today would make the kind of alimony
award Moran describes after just three months of marriage. R.T. EISLER, supra note
23, at 41. Section 236 provides that the court should consider the length of the marriage as a factor in alimony considerations. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (Mclinney

1977).
133. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
134. See text accompanying notes 172-178 infra.
135. A10394, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by Assemblyman
Nicolosi); A10681, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by Assemblyman Hevesi
as companion bill to S8225).
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Gold and Gordon introduced similar legislation in the Senate. 136
The Gordon bill was passed by the Senate in March 1978.137 The
Nicolosi memorandum on his bill stated: "By making the test a
single requirement-that is, proof that the former wife is habitually
living with another man-the cause of justice would be better
served."' 138 Senator Gold's memorandum argued that the bill would
"restore the legislative intent" and "remove the technical interpre139
tation which created a new method for avoiding the statute.'
These bills would make it impossible for a divorced woman
receiving court-ordered alimony payments to live with another man
without jeopardizing her alimony, regardless of the circumstances.
They solve none of the problems of section 248: The sexual conduct of a wife is given greater emphasis, and financial circumstances are still not a factor.
This approach parallels the history of a similar statute in
California. 140 When the California statute was enacted in 1974, it
provided for revocation of an order of support if the person
receiving the support is "living with a person of the opposite sex
and holding himself or herself out as the spouse of the person for a
total of 30 days or more, either consecutive or nonconsecutive, although not married to the person."1 4 ' This statute is similar to section 248. However, the California law was amended in 1976 to remove the holding-out requirement. It now provides:
(a) IT]here shall be a rebuttable presumption, affecting the
burden of proof, of decreased need for support if the supported
party is cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex. Upon such
a finding of changed circumstances, the court may modify the
payment of support ....
(b) Holding oneself out to be the husband or wife of the
person with whom one is cohabiting is not necessary to constitute cohabitation as the term is used in this section.
136. S7144, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by Sen. Gordon); S8225,
201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by Sen. Gold). Another bill eliminates both
the holding-out requirement and judicial discretion to continue alimony. This bill requires automatic termination of alimony if a former wife cohabits with another man.
A11722, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by Assemblyman Hirsch).
137. S7144, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (passed by Senate Mar. 15, 1978). The
bill was not reported out of the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
138. Nicolosi Memorandum on A10394, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978).
139. Gold Memorandum on S8225, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978).
140. Act of Sept. 26, 1974, ch. 1388, 1974 Cal. Stats. 2911, as amended by Act
of July 8, 1976, ch. 380, § 1, 1976 Cal. Stats. 1028 (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 4801.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1979)).
141. Id. § 1.
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(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude later modification
142
of support upon proof of change of circumstances.
Although the California law eliminates the holding-out requirement, its negative effects may be ameliorated by three features of California law. Unlike New York, California is a
community-property state: The wife has a right to share in the
marital property both during the marriage and after divorce. 14 3 In
addition, unlike section 248, the California law provides for modification, rather than just elimination, of an alimony obligation and allows reins tatement of alimony when the ex-wife no longer cohabits
with another man. 144
The California law places the burden of proof on the party
receiving support rather than on the party seeking relief. It is difficult, however, to understand why a presumption of decreased need
arises when someone lives with a person of the opposite sex, but
not when, for example, the former spouse moves in with her or his
parents. In In re Leib,14 5 a former husband sought to terminate alimony payments under the new California statute. The court found
that the homemaking, housekeeping, cooking, and sexual services
provided by the ex-wife for the man with whom she was living
have monetary value. 146 The court held that she could not give
away her services "where the result [would be] to create a status of
apparent continuing need and thus overcome the presumption created by [the new law]." 14 7 The court reduced the ex-wife's support
payment from $500 to $10 per month, finding it unfair for the exhusband to pay his ex-wife the money value of services she provides to another man. 148 The ex-wife bad been married for fifteen
years and had custody of the child. Under the court's analysis, it is
difficult to imagine how a woman living with another man can ever
overcome the presumption of decreased need.
142.

CAL.CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (West Cum.Supp. 1979).

143. See id. § 4800; note 39 supra and accompanying text.
144. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4801.5(a), (c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see notes 49-53
supra and accompanying text.
145. 80 Cal. App. 3d 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763 (Ct. App. 1978).
146. Id. at 640, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
147. Id. at 643, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
148. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra. Puerto Rico also has a statute
providing for alimony modification based on the ex-wife's misconduct; this statute
permits revocation of alimony if alimony becomes unnecessary, if the wife remarries,
"or if [the ex-wifel lives in public concubinage or observes a licentious behavior."
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 385 (1968).
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New York State Bar Association Bill
A bill drafted by the Family Section of the New York State
Bar Association, sponsored by the State Bar Association, and introduced in the New York State Assembly and Senate provides:
Subject to the provisions of section two hundred thirty-six
...
the court, in its discretion, upon application of the husband
on notice and after hearing, may... suspend, reduce, or terminate the payments of money for the support of the wife upon a
showing that the wife is living with another person under circumstances which the court finds should result in the modification, suspension, reduction, or termination of said payments of
money because such living arrangements result in such change
149
of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of the wife.
,

According to Lester Wallman, Chairman of the Committee on
Legislation of the Family Section of the New York State Bar Association, the "bill takes the question of sex and punishment out of
any alimony award modification." 150 The memorandum accompanying the bill asserts that section 248 "has been ineffective and almost impossible to enforce. . . .The determination of whether alimony should be continued or terminated should be made upon
15 1
financial considerations only."'
The bill is an improvement over present law because it allows
alimony to be reduced or suspended, rather than only eliminated. 152 The bill also affects more than just cohabitation between
a man and a woman: It applies to a divorced woman living with
"another person"; this includes another woman,15 3 parents,
and
friends. However, if change in financial circumstances is the key
consideration, it is difficult to understand why the bill is needed,
154
since section 236 permits alimony modification on this ground.

149. A11141, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by Assemblyman Burrows); S8592, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by Sen. Pisani). The bill has
been reintroduced in the 1979 legislative session. A1846, 202d N.Y. Legis. Sess.
(1979) (sponsored by Assemblyman Burrows).
150. Letter from Lester Wallman to author (Sept. 20, 1978) (emphasis in original) (on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review).
151. Burrows Memorandum on A11141, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978).
152. See notes 49-53 supra and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Kenney v. Kenney, 76 Misc. 2d 927, 352 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (section 248 held inapplicable when ex-wife is living with another woman and
holding herself out as married, because wording of statute refers only to "another
man").
154. See text accompanying notes 172-178 infra.
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The Diggs Bill
Assemblywoman Estella Diggs sponsored a bill that permits

termination of alimony if the court makes a discretionary determination that the ex-wife "has acquired access to additional financial

resources as a result of another person's contributions to her household expenses"; alimony payments are reinstated if the ex-wife
loses access to the additional resources. 155 Ms. Diggs argues in her
memorandum of support that the solution to the "holding-out" language "is not to simply strike out the archaic language, since the

consequence of that would be to deny women court-ordered support in any circumstance in which they might choose to live with a

man, whether or not there were financial contributions involved at
all."'156 She argues that her bill is "an attempt to be as fair as possi-

ble under a set of specific circumstances despite the fact that the
legal context in which alimony is awarded remains generally irrational."157
ARGUMENT FOR UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

Section 248 has been attacked as a denial of equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment. 158 Such challenges have been

rejected. 159 The Supreme Court traditionally has analyzed equal
protection challenges under either the strict scrutiny or rational basis test.' 60 The strict scrutiny test is invoked when a statute discriminates against a suspect class 16 ' or infringes on the exercise of
155, A12398, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (sponsored by Assemblywoman
Diggs).
156. Diggs Memorandum on A12398, 201st N.Y. Legis. Sess. (1978) (emphasis
in original).
157. Id. It is interesting to note that the Diggs bill provides for alimony modification if the ex-wife receives additional funds, but not if she supports another man
with her alimony payments. See text accompanying notes 55-57. Perhaps
Assemblywoman Diggs understands that a woman receiving alimony payments
should have some degree of freedom to determine how she spends this money.
158. U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1.
159. See Brief for Defendant, Gallin v. Gallin, No. 33710/74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
filed Mar. 10, 1977) (action for alimony termination). The argument that § 248 is
unconstitutional was made by defendant's attorney, Kristen Glen. It was rejected by
the court in an unreported decision. The case was later settled out of court. A similar
argument was also rejected in Hall v. Hall, 82 Misc. 2d 814, 372 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Fam.
Ct. 1975), affd mem., 55 A.D.2d 752, 389 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976).
160. See generally Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994-1060 (1978). This "two-tier" approach
has been discredited. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
318-19 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

161.

The Supreme Court noted in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
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a fundamental right. 1 6 2 Such statutes are held unconstitutional unless the state can prove that they promote a "compelling governmental interest." Other legislative classifications are tested by the
"rational basis test": Such classifications are upheld if they rationally relate to a legitimate governmental purpose. 1 63 In a number of
cases the Court has scrutinized classifications based on sex using an
64
intermediate standard. 1
A family court judge in Hall v. Hall1 65 upheld section 248 under the rational basis test: "The State, in exercising its traditional
power to regulate the marital relationship, can rationally distinguish between persons merely living together in a temporary liaison and the more permanent relationship described in the statute
of 'habitually living with another man and holding herself out as his
wife.' "166 The court also pointed out that the statute allows the
court discretion to consider the circumstances of each case. 1 67 Although Hall was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court in the Third Department, 168 an equal protection argument might prove successful in a higher court.
If the purpose of section 248 is to "punish divorced women
who engage in a sexual life which somehow offends the double
standard as to the proper behavior for an ex-wife . . . the purpose
is not legitimate." 169 If the purpose of the statute is to avoid dou-

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), "the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is ...
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id. at 28. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954) (national origin).
162. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (right to privacy); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-37 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (right to travel).
163. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314
(1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-85 (1970). In his dissent in Murgia,
Justice Marshall notes that under this test, i rational relation will almost always be
found and the statute upheld. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 318-19 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. See note 171 infra.
165. 82 Misc. 2d 814, 372 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Fam. Ct. 1975), aff'd mem., 55 A.D.2d
752, 389 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976).
166. Id. at 816, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248
(McKinney 1977)).
167. Id.
168. Hall v. Hall, 55 A.D.2d 752, 389 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976).
169. Brief for Defendant at 16, Gallin v. Gallin, No. 33710/74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
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ble support, the statute could be found unconstitutional because
the "classification selected does not 'reasonably relate' to the purpose."' 70 Section 248 distinguishes between ex-wives who habitually live with men other than their ex-husbands and hold themselves out as married from ex-wives who are either not living with
other men or are not holding themselves out as married. This classification is both over- and under-inclusive. It is under-inclusive
because it excludes such obvious cases of double support as when
the ex-wife is living with and being supported by a woman or when
she is living with a man who supports her, but she does not hold
herself out as being married. The statute is also over-inclusive: It
provides for elimination of alimony regardless of whether there is
double support and, since it provides only for termination of alimony, it may deprive a woman of alimony after the man with
whom she is living no longer supports her.' 7 '
BPEAL

In light of the broad discretionary powers conferred by section
236, the court in In re Anonymous 7 2 questioned the necessity of
retaining section 248.173 Similarly, the editor of the Family Law
Review writes:
We have, for some time, felt that DRL § 236 gives the

court ample discretion to either eliminate or reduce alimony
[when a divorced woman lives with another man], based upon
the financial impact . . . such relationship may have upon the
filed Mar. 10, 1977) (action for alimony termination) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).
170. Id. at 16-17.
171. Id. It could also be argued that the statute as it now exists discriminates
against women in violation of the equal protection clause (unless the statute is made
gender-free as a result of Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979)). Since the statute penalizes an ex-wife who cohabits with another man, but not an ex-husband who cohabits
with another woman, it treats men and women differently. See text accompanying
note 64 supra. Courts apply an intermediate test to scrutinize classifications based on
sex. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 160, at
1063-77. Furthermore, § 248 should be found unconstitutional under a strict-scrutiny
equal protection analysis. Such scrutiny is justified because the statute infringes on a
fundamental right: "the exercise of intimate personal choices." L. TRIBE, supra note
160, at 1003. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942). See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172. 90 Misc. 2d 801, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Fam. Ct. 1977).
173. Id. at 809, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
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former spouse. Those cases which have considered this question'
and applied § 248 rather than § 236 in determining whether the
court should grant relief, have considered the wrong factors.
The determination should be made upon financial consideration only. 17 4
Although this position was not adopted by the State Bar Association, there is substantial support for the view that alimony modification should be based on economic, rather than moral, factors. 175
This would obviate the need for section 248, because alimony is
modifiable under section 236 upon a showing of a substantial
77
change in financial circumstances. 1 76 The court in Hall v. Hall'
also indicated that section 248 is not needed: "[HIad the predecessor to section 236 vested such broad discretionary power in the
court, the necessity for a specific statutory provision to deal with
the situation of the ex-wife living with another man and holding
herself out as his wife is questionable." 178
It could be argued that repeal is not advisable because it may
be difficult for a husband to prove that his former wife receives financial support from the man with whom she is living. However,
such proof problems are no greater than those raised by other section 236 cases; moreover, a wife often encounters enormous proof
problems in demonstrating her husband's income to justify an alimony award, particularly when the husband owns a business. If the
financial change in circumstances is not substantial, the payments
should not be modified; if it is substantial, proof should not be impossible to find.
CONCLUSION

Without a mechanism for equitable distribution of property
upon divorce, section 248 works particularly harsh results. A decision to modify alimony should be made in light of the present inability of courts to distribute property equitably upon divorce and
the inadequate recognition of a homemaker's contribution to a marriage.
174. Samuelson, Notes and Comments, FAM. L. REV., Dec. 1977, at 1 (emphasis
in original).
175. See Foster & Freed, Family Law, 29 SYIAcUsE L. REv. 569, 584 (1978).
176. Covert v. Covert, 48 Misc. 2d 386, 388, 264 N.Y.S.2d 820, 822 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
177. 82 Misc. 2d 814, 372 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Fam. Ct. 1975), aff'd mem., 55 A.D.2d
752, 389 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1976).
178. Id. at 816, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
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An article written after passage of the Senate bill, which eliminated the holding-out requirement, asserted:
Before the Assembly acts as hastily as the Senate, I wonder
if they know that the Northrup marriage was one of 24 years of
duration; that Mrs. Northrup raised four children and worked in
their home as hard as did Northrup in his own plumbing and
heating business.
I wonder if the Assembly is considering-while Mrs.
Northrup worked seven days a week 12 to 16 hours a day,
receiving no salary, developing no marketable skills, accruing no
Social Security benefits, no unemployment insurance benefits,
no health benefits, no pension for her later years-that Mr. and
Mrs. Northrup were both contributing to the general welfare of
the relationship but only Northrup 179
was increasing his personal
worth in the work-for-money world?
Perhaps if Judge Wachtler realized Ms. Northrup's entitlement
to alimony, he would not have been willing to cut off her payments
merely because she had lived with another man for six months. 180
With or without major divorce reform, section 248 remains unnecessary, outdated, and highly discriminatory to women.

Lois Ullman
179. Schwartzman, Alimony Grotesqueries,Newsday, Apr. 14, 1978, at 72.
180. "In this day, when the courts are striving to eliminate discrimination between the sexes, section 248 is a step backward to the dark ages." In re Anonymous,
90 Misc. 2d 801, 809, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1006 (Fam. Ct. 1977). The present system
of enforcement of court-ordered support does not help the situation. By the time the
court of appeals ruled in Ms. Northrup's favor, Mr. Northrup's attorney no longer

knew where Mr. Northrup was. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1978, at B10,col. 1.
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STEMMING THE TIDE OF OFFSHORE
OIL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF:
THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE LEGAL CHALLENGES
Since the 1974 Arab oil boycott, the federal government has
stepped up efforts to discover domestic sources of energy in an attempt to achieve energy independence. Increased threats of energy
shortages have produced intensified efforts to exploit the yet
untapped potential of oil off the Atlantic coast and in the Gulf of
Alaska.' The need for resource exploration and development of
these virgin areas is attended by the need to balance this development against the possible adverse environmental consequences of
these projects. However, the momentum gathered by federal offshore oil projects has resulted, at times, in hasty decisions that
have prevented detailed assessment of environmental considerations.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)2 provides the major vehicle for challenging these governmental projects; it establishes guidelines to insure that a detailed environmental assessment is made before implementing major federal projects
which could "significantly [affect] the quality of the human environment."3 However, efforts to enjoin federal offshore oil projects that
1. See AD Hoc SELECT COMM. ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, 94TH CONG.,
2D SESS., STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF OFFSHORE OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOP4 (Comm. Print 1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
3. Id. § 4332(2)(C). The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
states in part:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which
will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.
Id. § 4321. NEPA further provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may
have an impact on man's environment;
MENT
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violate NEPA or other regulations 4 have produced only mixed results.
Successful court challenges to offshore drilling projects ultimately depend on whether a preliminary injunction can be secured
at the leasing stage of a project to retard oil development until the
litigation is completed. Presently, some courts improperly apply
preliminary injunction criteria; preliminary injunctive relief has
been wrongly denied, undermining efforts to slow down offshore
development until proper environmental safeguards are implemented.
This Note first examines the significance of preliminary injunc(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation
with the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter
II of this chapter, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in
decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
(E) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources...
Id. § 4332.
4. A number of other statutory violations have been alleged in conjunction with
NEPA challenges to offshore oil development, including violations of: the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976); the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); and the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976).
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1139-40 (D. Mass.) (order granting preliminary injunction), stay denied, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147 (1st Cir.
1978), preliminary injunction vacated, No. 78-1036 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 1979); New
York v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1769 (E.D.N.Y.) (order granting preliminary injunction), stay granted, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1793 (2d Cir.), stay aff'd, 429 U.S. 1307,
order granting preliminary injunction rev'd, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1794 (2d Cir. 1976),
permanent injunction granted, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1798 (E.D.N.Y.), revd sub nom.
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1238 (1978). However, NEPA challenges are the most frequent and will be
the primary subject of this Note.
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tions in offshore oil litigation; it then analyzes how courts have interpreted and utilized the criteria necessary for granting this kind
of relief. Finally, it suggests how preliminary injunctions can best
be understood and applied in the context of offshore oil cases to assure compliance with the spirit of NE PA.
The most recent cases, which concern attempts to stop lease
sales off the Atlantic coast and in the Gulf of Alaska, are included
in the discussion. Particular attention is focused on the different
approaches taken by the district and circuit courts in New York v.
Kleppe.5 This Note asserts that the Second Circuit in Kleppe improperly granted a stay of the preliminary injunction ordered by
the lower court, and analyzes the possible effect of this decision on
subsequent offshore oil litigation. Further, the recent amendments
to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 6 and their possible effect
on the continuing utility of preliminary injunctions are explored.
THE OFFSHORE

OIL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

A brief review of the numerous steps involved in offshore oil
development demonstrates the importance of preliminary injunctive
relief at the leasing stage of a project. The Secretary of the Interior
is empowered by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 19537
to grant leases to interested private industrial concerns for oil and
gas development more than three miles offshore. 8 Initially, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), acting under the direction of
the Department of the Interior, selects general areas to be included in a leasing schedule: An area is selected by weighing and
balancing the factors which will lead to "the most expeditious discovery and production- of oil and gas." 9 These factors include: (1)
Assessment of oil and gas potential, (2) possible effects on the envi5. 9 Envir. Rep. Gas. 1769 (E.D.N.Y.) (order granting preliminary injunction),
stay granted, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1793 (2d Cir.), stay aff'd, 429 U.S. 1307, order
granting preliminary injunction rev'd, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1794 (2d Cir. 1976), per-

manent injunction granted, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1798 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom.
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1238 (1978).
6. Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (to be codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
7. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
8. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1970).
9. M. ADAMS, C. JOHN, R. KELLY, A. LAPOINTE & R. MEURER, MINERAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 7-8 (Geological Survey
Circular No. 720, 1975) [hereinafter cited as OCS MINERAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT]. "A leasing schedule is the framework used to determine the timing and ini-

tiation of individual sale procedures. It is continually being updated and revised
within the Department of the Interior." Id. at 8.
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ronment from OCS development, (3) "alternative energy sources,"' 0
12
(4) "availability of technology,"' and (5) "proximity to markets."
Once an area is selected and scheduled for a possible lease
sale, numerous geological 13 and geophysical 14 studies are made by
the federal government and by private industry. 15 The data collected are used by the Geological Survey, a bureau level organization within the Department of the Interior, to make specific tract
16
selections, resource evaluations, and lease management plans.
Private industry utilizes these data to nominate possible tracts and
prepare bids for lease sales.1 7 In addition, baseline studies are conducted by the Department of the Interior to establish "an environmental benchmark against which future measurements, taken during the monitoring phase, (8 1 can be compared for the purpose of
detecting possible adverse effects resulting from exploration and
development activities."'19
After the Geological Survey prepares a report concerning
the geology and mineral resources of the area, the BLM publishes
calls for nominations in the Federal Register.20 The reaction of the
public and the oil and gas industry to this official notice provides
an indication of interest in individual offshore tracts that subsequently may be offered for lease. 21 If sufficient interest is expressed, tracts are selected by the BLM based upon a consideration of resource potential, environmental impact, and potential
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Geological data are collected by bottom sampling, shallow coring, and deep
stratigraphic testing. The samples obtained help to identify the type and origin of
the geological formation and yield specifc scientific information used for detecting
traces of petroleum. Id. at 9.
14. Geophysical exploration involves measuring the velocity of seismic waves
through rock formations to identify "potentially hazardous conditions such as surface
faulting, potential slide areas, or shallow gas pockets." Id. Deep-penetration seismic
studies are also made to identify "structures such as salt domes, folds or faults that
are most likely to be encountered in the area." Id.
15. Id. at 8-9.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id.
18. The monitoring phase begins after the baseline study is made and the lease
sale has taken place. During this phase it is determined whether petroleum exploration or production activities are affecting the environment. Id.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 10.
21. Id.
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conflict with other industries such as fishing and recreation. 22 A list
of selected tracts is published in the FederalRegister.
NEPA requires that a draft environmental impact statement
(EIS) be prepared by the BLM once the tracts are selected. The
draft EIS must include a description of the tract area environment,
a "detailed analysis on a tract-by-tract basis of any possible adverse
impacts on the enviromnent,"23 alternatives to leasing, and the
"consultation and coordination with others in preparation of the
statement."2 4 The draft EIS is submitted to the Council on Environmental Quality and made available for public inspection. A public hearing is held at least thirty days after the draft EIS is released
to gather the public's oral and written reactions to the statement.
These comments and any additional information are incorporated
into a final EIS which is used by the Secretary of the Interior in
deciding whether to hold a lease sale.2 5 If a sale is held,
[a] notice is published in the Federal Register giving at least 30

days advance notice of the date, place, and time that bids are to
be opened, the tracts to be included in the sale, the terms under which the sale will be held, and26any special stipulations that
may be imposed on particular tracts.

The BLM conducts the sale, usually selling leases on the basis
of a cash bonus bid and variable royalty payments. 2 7 In most cases
twenty percent of the bonus money must accompany the initial
bid; the remaining eighty percent and the first year's rental is paid
upon the government's acceptance of the bid. 2 8 The government

has the right to reject any of the accepted bids after conducting a
postsale evaluation. 2 9 The recent lease sale in the mid-Atlantic,
which netted over 1.1 billion dollars in bonus bids alone, 30 demon-

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10-11.
26. Id. at 11.
27. For the different bidding alternatives that the Secretary of the Interior
may choose, see Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 205, 92 Stat. 629
(amending 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)-(b) (1970)).
28. See OCS MiNERAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 9, at 11-12.
29. Id. at 11.
30. See New York v. KIeppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1798, 1800 (E.D.N.Y.) (permanent injunction proceedings), rev'd sub nom. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1238 (1978).
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strates the tremendous outlay of capital that is involved at even
this early stage.
Once a lease is issued, the lessee may conduct operations to
discover and produce oil and gas from Outer Continental Shelf
submerged lands, within a compact tract not exceeding 5,760
acres. 31 The lease is granted for five years and continues for "as
long thereafter as oil or gas may be produced from the area in
paying quantities, or drilling or well reworking 32operations as approved by the Secretary are conducted thereon."
The lessee must submit an exploration plan to the Secretary of
the Interior for approval before commencing operations. 33 Once
exploration proceeds, the lessee is also subject to "a complex set of
34
specffic OCS Orders issued by the U.S. [Geological Survey]."
If oil or gas is found, a development plan must be submitted
to the Secretary. 35 Approval of this plan may constitute "a major
federal action";3 6 if it does, the Secretary must prepare another
37
EIS before deciding whether to allow such activity to proceed.
As shown, an offshore oil development project consists of a
number of incremental steps. Although continual opportunity for
evaluation is provided at each stage of the project, the lease sale is
a critical point: From then on a project rapidly builds momentum.
Once a lease is granted, public control of the tracts is replaced by
the governing terms of a lease. Huge sums of money change hands
and plans for exploration proceed, requiring additional investments. The lease sale constitutes a shift from the slow-moving, bureaucratic process of governmental planning to the overwhelming
financial impetus of private industrial development.
The increased input by private industry at this stage creates
momentum which may be impossible to reverse. Once the tremendous input of capital and manpower begins, the lessees are likely
31. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1970), as amended by Act of Sept. 18, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629.
32. Id. § 1337(b)(2), as amended by Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372,
92 Stat. 629.
33. See Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 206, 92 Stat. 629 (amending 43 U.S.C. § 1340 (1970)).
34. See AD Hoc SELECT COMMITTEE ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 1, at 9.

35. See Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 208, 92 Stat. 629 (to be
codified in 43 U.S.C. § 1351).

36. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(C) (1970). Normally, the agency determines wheth-

er a project is a major federal action.

37. Id. See Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 208, 92 Stat. 629 (to be
codified in 43 U.S.C. § 1351).
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to defend their interests vigorously. The government itself has
more interest in continuing the project after this point because of
the tremendous bonus payments it would have to return, with interest, to the lessees; 38 in addition, the government might be liable
for other compensatory damages caused by cancellation of the
leases. 3 9 Even the public may become insistent upon developing
additional domestic energy sources once exploration begins. If oil is
found, prospects for halting the project become even slimmer.
Thus, the private, government, and public interests are likely to
shift strongly in favor of an oil development project once the lease
sale takes place and exploration begins.
If a project needs reconsideration or if additional environmental assessments are necessary, the lease sale stage is the most logical point to halt operations until problems are resolved. At that
point the project has not yet gained sufficient momentum to render
other considerations and alternatives infeasible. Increased public interest and industrial activity resulting from the sale are factors
which courts will consider in any litigation initiated to halt the project. Proposed changes in the project or energy alternatives will
inevitably be viewed in light of investments already made. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated the
problem succinctly in Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingCommittee, Inc.
v. AEC, 40 a case involving construction and licensing of a nuclear
facility:
Once a facility has been completely constructed, the economic
cost of any alteration may be very great. In the language of
NEPA, there is likely to be an "irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of resources," which will inevitably restrict the
Commissioner's options. Either the licensees will have to undergo a major expense in making alterations in a completed facility or the environmental harm will have to be tolerated. It is all
41
too probable that the latter result would come to pass.
A preliminary injunction issued at the leasing stage to curtail
further development of a project until pending litigation is resolved
is the best way to insure objective evaluation of environmental considerations by the court. In addition, such relief at this stage insures that the options of the Secretary are not restricted if further
environmental assessments are deemed necessary.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See notes 188-189 infra and accompanying text.
See note 188 infra and accompanying text.
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1128 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1970)).
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STANDARDS FOR GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

General Standard
A preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy designed primarily to preserve the "status quo" pending a final determination
on the merits. 42 It is a temporary restraint on further action by any
of the parties until the litigation is resolved. 43 Because a preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy, no single rule outlines the
circumstances which justify granting relief. The decision whether
to grant an injunction is generally left to the discretion of the trial
judge. 44 However, certain criteria have been developed which
provide guidance for courts. Plaintiffs typically must demonstrate:
(1) There is a strong likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the
merits; (2) plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if relief is withheld;
(3) granting relief will not unduly harm the defendant; and (4) it is
in the "public interest" to grant the relief.45 "[B]alancing the equi-

ties," 46 a court weighs the relative harm which may be suffered by
each party if relief is granted or denied.
Courts often have permitted flexible balancing of these criteria
when dealing with environmental issues. A preliminary injunction

42. See, e.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). The
court in Hamilton stated:
[A] preliminary injunction-as indicated by the numerous more or less synonymous adjectives used to label it-is, by its very nature, interlocutory, tentative, provisional, ad interim, impermanent, mutable, not fixed or final or
conclusive, characterized by its for-the-time-beingness. It serves as an equitable policing measure to prevent the parties from harming one another during the litigation; to keep the parties, while the suit goes on, as far possible
in the respective positions they occupied when the suit began.
Id. at 742. See also 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-TCE 65.04, at 65-35 to -55 (2d ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
43. A preliminary injunction should be distinguished from a temporary restraining order (TRO) which is a remedy for emergency situations, when there is no
time for a hearing. The immediacy of the harm is the controlling factor in issuance of
a TRO. See Leshy, Interlocutory Injunctive Relief in Environmental Cases: A
Primerfor the Practitioner,6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639, 640-41 (1977).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 43 (1936); see also 7 MOORE,
supra note 42, 65.04, at 65-35 to -36.
45. See, e.g., Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259
F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358
F. Supp. 584, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Cox v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 92, 95-97 (D. Minn. 1970). See generally
Leshy, supra note 43, at 641.
46. 7 MooRE, supra note 42, 65.04, at 65-50. See Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 440 (1944); Perry v. Perry, 190 F.2d 601, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also
Leshy, supra note 43, at 641.
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has been granted in some cases where the probability of success on
the merits has not been amply demonstrated, if there is a proper
showing of hardship to the plaintiff.47 Alternative balancing tests
also have been developed. In New York v. NRC, 48 even though a
preliminary injunction was not granted,4 9 the court declared:
We have frequently recited the standards which are to be applied by a district court in this circuit in determining when such
a motion [for preliminary injunction] should be granted. To obtain the preliminary relief he seeks the movant must make " 'a
clear showing of either (1) probable success on the merits and
possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and
a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.' "50

The court concluded that proving hardship ultimately depends on
51
demonstrating irreparable injury.
Defining IrreparableInjury in NEPA Cases
Irreparable injury can be difficult to prove where plaintiffs
premise their right to relief on a NEPA-EIS infraction; such an
infraction itself imposes no immediate or direct harm to the environment;5 2 irreparable harm can only be a future consequence of
the present NEPA infraction. Accordingly, in certain circumstances
courts have concluded that a NEPA violation alone does not give

rise to irreparable injury. 53 However, other courts have inferred ir47. See, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co.,
441 F.2d 232, 235-36 (4th Cir. 1971) ("substantial issues" on the merits raised; preliminary injunctive relief granted on showing that plaintiff's need for protection outweighed probable injury to defendants).
48. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1825 (2d Cir. 1977).
49. See note 53 infra.
50. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1829 (quoting Triebwasser & Katz v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1358 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v.
Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis in original)).
51. Id. at 1830.
52. Failure to include a necessary factor in an EIS may ultimately have some
effect on the environment, but will not have a direct, immediate effect at the time
the factor is excluded from the EIS. A mere omission from a written report obviously
cannot impose any immediate, irreparable, environmental harm. However, future irreparable harm may result from the absence of a detailed environmental assessment
before a project continues.
53. See New York v. NRC, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1825, 1826-27 (2d Cir. 1977). Appellants claimed that the defendants had violated § 102(2)(c) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(c) (1976), "by licensing, approving, allowing or executing the transportation
by air of plutonium and other SNM [special nuclear material] without having com-
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reparable injury from the government's noncompliance with the

Act;54 the harm results from the failure of decisionmakers to consider all environmental factors as required by NEPA. 5 5 Courts
have also defined the harm as an "irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of resources" that results from beginning or con56
tinuing a project.

These definitions of irreparable injury in NEPA cases were
clearly articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Lathan v. Volpe 57 and
the Seventh Circuit in Scherr v. Volpe. 58 In Lathan, plaintiff

sought a preliminary injunction to prevent further governmental
acquisitions of property for a proposed interstate highway because
no EIS had been prepared. The court, issuing the preliminary injunction, 59 viewed these acquisitions as "irreversible and irretrievapiled an [EIS] relating to the environmental consequences of an air shipment of
SNM ....
."Id. at 1827. The court found no imminent, irretrievable commitment of
resources, since the challenged shipments had been made without accident over previous years and no extraordinary commitment of resources had been made by defendants. Id. at 1833. See also Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1241
(6th Cir. 1974) (district court did not abuse discretion in permitting continued construction of a dam which would not significantly impair the environment even
though inadequate EIS had been prepared).
54. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.
1975).
55. See, e.g., Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502
(D.C. Cir. 1974). In Jones the court held:
NEPA was intended to ensure that decisions about federal actions would be
made only after responsible decision-makers had fully adverted to the environmental consequences of the actions, and had decided that the public
benefits flowing from the actions outweighed their environmental costs.
Thus, the harm with which courts must be concerned in NEPA cases is not,
strictly speaking, harm to the environment, but rather the failure of decisionmakers to take environmental factors into account in the way that NEPA
mandates.
Id. at 512 (footnote omitted). See also Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir.
1972); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 430 F. Supp. 855, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Keith v.
Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1349-51 (C.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). However in Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Callaway,
497 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1974), the court refused to allow an injunction when plaintiffs could not demonstrate that an inadequte EIS prepared by defendant would
likely compel abandonment of the project. See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE
COURTS 239-42 (1973); Leshy, supra note 43, at 659-61.
56. See Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1971); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1127-28 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See generally F. ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 239-42; Leshy, supra note 43, at
659-61.
57. 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971).
58. 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
59. Id. at 1121-22. The Lathan court utilized the standard originally articulated
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ble [commitments] of resources," 60 which could restrict the options
of decisionmakers. In Scherr the Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction that had been granted to halt further construction
of a highway following plaintiffs' demonstration of a NEPA infraction. The Seventh Circuit declared:
[If the project were allowed to proceed after the plaintiffs had
demonstrated a probability of success on the merits, [NEPA's]
"careful and informed decision making process" would be lost
forever. In order to protect the rights of the plaintiff to have the
agency consider the environmental consequences of this project,
the district court properly directed that a preliminary injunction
61
issue during the pendency of the proceedings.
A number of courts have limited the Lathan-Scherr standard
to apply only where no EIS is prepared at all or where it has serious substantive deficiencies. 6 2 The Lathan-Scherr standard, however, should be applied to offshore oil cases, not only when serious
substantive deficiencies are found in the EIS, but also whenever a
detailed assessment of environmental harms has not been made at
63
the leasing stage.
GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AGAINST OFFSHORE OIL
DEVELOPMENT: THE NEED FOR A PROPER BALANCE

Probability of Success on the Merits
Seeking preliminary relief to enjoin an offshore oil project requires showing a probability of success on the merits; whether success is sufficently demonstrated depends on the precise issues litigated. Most courts are unlikely to issue a preliminary injunction
unless some chance of success on the merits is shown. 6 4 However,
high probability of success on the merits is not always necessary if
the other factors weigh heavily in plaintiff's favor. 6 5 As indicated,
the Second Circuit in New York v. NRC 66 held that a " 'sufficiently
by the court in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 40 & 41 supra.
60. 455 F.2d at 1121 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC,
449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
61. 466 F.2d at 1034.
62. See, e.g., Essex County Preservation Ass'n v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956,
962-63 (1st Cir. 1976). See generally Leshy, supra note 43, at 661.
63. See text accompanying notes 82-84 infra.
64. See Leshy, supra note 43, at 643.
65. See notes 44 & 47 supra and accompanying text.
66. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1825 (2d Cir. 1977).
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serious [showing] going to the merits' "67 standard could be used as
an alternative to probability of success on the merits. Presumably,
such "sufficienfly serious questions" arise whenever there is a clear
dispute between the parties concerning substantial issues. The
time limitations inherent in seeking preliminary injunctive relief at
the lease sale stage create the need for this alternative: It allows
greater flexibility; more attention can be focused on balancing the
hardships of the parties rather than on analysis of the merits. Indepth study of the merits is better left for the permanent injunction proceeding.
IrreparableInjury to Plaintiffs
Since a preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy, plaintiff
must prove an irreparable injury that cannot be adequately compensated financially. 68 In environmental cases, irreparable harm can
be easily demonstrated by showing outright destruction of a distinct and valuable resource.69 However, in cases where plaintiff
seeks to enjoin defendant from making "an incremental investment
in an environmentally harmful project," 70 irreparable harm is more
difficult to establish; such an investment may in itself pose little additional harm to the environment. In such cases several courts
have accepted less direct demonstrations of irreparable harm. 71
Leasing an offshore oil tract is clearly an incremental investment. And, although transfer of property in itself can in no way physically damage the environment, 72 the direct and predictable results
of granting the lease should be considered in analyzing harm to
plaintiffs. The exploratory phase, which immediately follows the
lease sale, can result in direct, irreparable damage to the marine
67. Id. at 1829 (quoting Triebwasser & Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535
F.2d 1356, 1358 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington
Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973))).
68. See Leshy, supra note 43, at 644.
69. Id. at 646.
70. Id. at 647.
71. See, e.g., Thompson v. Fugate, 452 F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1971) (landowners resisting condemnation will be irreparably hanned if title passes before trial, even If
character of land will not be changed); Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 820 (D.
Hawaii 1973) (suspension of core drilling and seismic studies vhich would further
project to test nuclear defenses); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.
Hawaii 1972) (suspension of design and engineering studies for interstate highway
even though studies caused no direct environmental impact). See generally Leshy,
supra note 43 at 647-48.
72. See Leshy, supra note 43, at 647.
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environment. 73 Other than the requirement for an exploration
plan, there are apparently no restrictions preventing the lessee
from rapidly expanding his exploration program. Thus the potential
harm which accompanies exploratory drilling7 4 might occur before
litigation surrounding a project is resolved.
In addition to the direct environmental problems that stem
from exploratory drilling, numerous indirect harms may result if
preliminary injunctive relief is not granted to prevent the lease
sale. Prior to the lease sale, a project has not yet gathered sufficient momentum to prevent its reevaluation. This is the point at
which legal challenges can be most effective. If a project is allowed
to continue before litigation is resolved, the substantial investments
of time and money that begin at this stage will work against a suc75
cessful challenge to improve or stop the project.
When a NEPA infraction is asserted, there is an even greater
Yeed to enjoin the project until the litigation is settled. NEPA was
enacted to ensure detailed environmental assessments of major federal projects. 76 If extensive assessments are made at the leasing
stage, the Secretary can make a more informed and rational decision whether to permit the project to proceed. Permitting a lease
sale before a detailed assessment of environmental factors is con77
ducted can seriously weaken the effect of NEPA requirements.
Once a contractual relationship is established between the parties,
additional environmental safeguards evolving from the permanent
injunction litigation may be difficult to implement. Before the re73.

The court in Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138 (D. Mass.)

(order granting preliminary injunction), stay denied, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147 (1st
Cir. 1978), preliminary injunction vacated, No. 78-1036 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 1979), recognized:
"Exploratory drilling is one of the most hazardous steps in developing offshore oil and gas. The potential hazard stems from the possibility of blow-

out, the sudden surge of oil or gas pressure up the drill hole causing loss of
control over the well. Although most blowouts involve only gas, large quantities of oil may be released to pollute the marine environment. [If] ignited[,] oil and gas may burn out of control, threatening personnel and
equipment."
Id. at 1145 (quoting 1 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OCS OIL AND GAS
-AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 58 (1974)).
74. 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1145.
75. If a project continues, even though the direct harm may become more identifiable, there becomes increasingly greater reason to maintain the project because of
the mounting commitments that have been made to it. See text accompanying notes

194 & 195 infra.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c); note 3 supra.
77. See note 125 infra and accompanying text.
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cent Amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act (the

Amendments) 78 were enacted, it was not even clear whether the
Secretary had the power to cancel leases. 79 The Amendments explicitly grant the Secretary this power; 0 however, the compensation to lessees mandated by the Amendments may weigh heavily in
the Secretary's decision whether to cancel the lease. In addition,
the substantial investments made after a lease sale may lead the
Secretary to simply include the required additional assessments in
an amended EIS without properly weighing them in deciding
whether to allow continuance of the project. 81

The lease sale and resulting exploratory activities constitute an
"irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources" that can
affect the outcome of subsequent permanent injunction litigation.
The Secretary may be reluctant to mandate additional environmental safeguards or environmentally safer alternatives because of this

commitment of resources. Thus, any harm which ultimately results
is a consequence of issuing the lease itself.

If irreparable harm is not quantifiably ascertainable in offshore
oil development cases concerning NEPA infractions, the Lathan-

Scherr method of balancing hardships8 2 should be applied. Under

this approach, the party attempting to enjoin a project until all en78. Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
79. See note 128 infra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 186 & 187 infra and accompanying text.
81. The Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), declared:
NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. It is to insure a fully informed
and well-considered decision, not necessarily a decision the judges of the
Court of Appeals or of this court would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency. Administrative decisions
should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial
procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute, not simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached.
Id. at 558 (citations omitted).
A discussion of this procedural interpretation of NEPA's mandates to the
agencies is beyond the scope of this Note. However, a broad application of the Supreme Court's dicta further supports the necessity of preliminary injunctive relief at
the leasing stage of an oil development project. If the Secretary of the Interior allows
a project to continue because of the substantial investments made, this decision cannot be interfered with by a court, unless it is clearly capricious and arbitrary. Id. at
554-55. Thus, to insure that additional environmental safeguards are appropriately
considered, substantial investments should be prevented until the Secretary can
weigh the need for these safeguards.
82. See text accompanying notes 52-63 supra.
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vironmental assessments are made need not prove that leasing the
property in itself causes irreparable harm. Plaintiff must demonstrate only that defendant did not comply with NEPA in designing
the project; s3 the burden then falls on defendant to demonstrate
that the injunction should not be granted. 84 This burden justifiably
should lie with defendant in cases involving offshore oil development, because the harm to defendant seems virtually nonexistent.
Harm to Defendants

The harm to defendants is customarily measured by the financial loss that will be suffered if the preliminary injunction is
granted. However, courts apply no single standard in determining
this harm. 85
Generally there is little harm to either the federal government
or the public when a preliminary injunction is issued to prevent
offshore drilling. It is extremely unlikely that delaying the lease
sale will affect bidding on the tracts to be leased. Developers remain eager to invest as long as an area retains its high oil potential;
the opportunity to collect millions of dollars in bonus bids is not
lost; it is merely postponed. 6
Nor is the national interest in energy self-sufficiency sacrificed
by delaying the lease sale. Whatever resources exist do not dissipate during the evaluation process.8 7 In fact, delay in exploiting
these resources will preserve them for needier times. Further, if
the government is anxious to determine offshore oil and gas potential, it can explore a region for oil and gas itself.88 Any exploratory
83. The danger exists in preliminary injunction proceedings that a court will attempt to resolve the NEPA issue rather than simply decide whether the issue is substantial enough to justify preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., New York v. Kleppe,
9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1794 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing order granting preliminary injunction). The approaching date of the lease sale places the preliminary injunction litigation under increasing time pressure, which could prevent careful and complete resolution of the NEPA issue at this stage. Once the NEPA issue is found to be
substantial, it should be resolved at the subsequent, less time-pressured permanent
injunction proceedings.
84. See Leshy, supra note 43, at 660-61.
85. See id. at 655, and cases cited therein.
86. See Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138 (D. Mass.) (order
granting preliminary injunction), stay denied, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147 (1st Cir.
1978), preliminary injunctionvacated, No. 78-1036 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 1979).
87. See id. at 1145; New York v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Gas. at 1792 (order
granting preliminary injunction).
88. See New York v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1792 (order granting preliminary injunction).
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expense it incurs can be recouped by charging the eventual developers more money for the leasing rights to explored territory. 89
Losses suffered by individual developers in preparing and
making bids may be recouped by submitting lesser bids at the future lease sale. 90 Any losses that do result can be considered an inherent aspect of the uncertainty of these speculative investments.91
The Public Interest

The public interest regarding offshore oil development can
sway with either party to the litigation. There is a strong public interest both in achieving energy self-sufficiency and in maintaining
an "unpolluted" environment. The facts of a given case determine
where the greater public interest lies. As previously noted, the
public interest in achieving energy self-sufficiency is virtually unaffected if a preliminary injunction is issued prior to a lease sale; the
public interest in maintaining the environment may be exceedingly
affected if such relief is denied. Therefore, a proper balancing of
the equities in the offshore oil situation should generally result in
preliminary injunctive relief at the lease sale stage of the project.
BALANCING THE EQUITIES IN OFFSHORE OIL LITIGATION

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton:
An Impressive Beginning
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton9 2 was the

first major case litigated under NEPA to involve offshore oil development. The case was tried before the American public had become significantly aware of the energy crisis.
Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Department of the Interior from leasing eighty tracts on the outer
continental shelf off eastern Louisiana because the EIS failed to
thoroughly explore alternatives to the lease sale. 93 The district
89. Of course, if the government finds nothing, the tracts will be worthless.
Thus, there may be a price to pay for impatience. See AD Hoc SELECT COMM. ON
OUTErt CONTInENTAL SHELF, 94th CONG., 2d SESS., supra note 1, at 9-10.

90. See Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1146 (order granting
preliminary injunction).

91. There is no guarantee that bids made will be accepted by the government,
see text accompanying note 29 supra, or that oil will be found once leases are
granted.
92. 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971) (order granting preliminary injunction),
aff'd, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

93. Alternatives not discussed included "meeting energy demands by federal
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court determined that the EIS was inadequate because it did "not
constitute the 'detailed statement' of environmental impact and
alternatives required by 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970)." 94 Upon
finding this shortcoming in the EIS, the court discussed the four
95
criteria commonly applied in preliminary injunctive proceedings,
summarily concluding that plaintiffs had succeeded in demonstrating the need for preliminary injunctive relief.96 Unfortunately,
the court did not clearly define the irreparable injury suffered by
plaintiffs. In fact, no analysis was made of any of the factors customarily considered in balancing the equities.9 7 Thus, a hazy precedent was set for future offshore oil litigation.
legislation or administrative action freeing current onshore and state-controlled offshore production from state market demand prorationing or a change in the Federal
Power Commission's national gas pricing policies." Id. at 167. Other alternatives
mentioned by the court were only superficially discussed. Id.
94. Id. at 166.
95. Id. at 166-67. The court applied the standards used in another District of
Columbia Circuit case, Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n,
259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958): (1) Whether petitioner has made a strong showing that
is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) whether petitioner has shown that irreparable
injury would result absent such relief; (3) whether issuance of a stay would substantially harm other parties in the proceeding; and (4) whether the public interest
would best be served by granting relief. Id. at 925.
96. 337 F. Supp. at 167.
97. The court found that plaintiffs would likely prevail on the merits and that
their interests would be irreparably harmed if the court did not grant injunctive relief. Id. However, no explanation of how plaintiffs' interest would be irreparably
harmed was given. The court did note that, "lulpon the execution of the leases, the
lessees will have the exclusive right to drill on and extract oil and gas from the lease
tracts and the right to construct and maintain platforms, dredged channels, pipelines
and other structures necessary to produce oil and gas." Id. at 166. Perhaps this carte
blanche given to the lessees convinced the court that a lease sale would initiate an
irreversible commitment of resources. The court also recognized
that there is a tremendous national energy crisis and that the Outer Continental Shelf has proved to be a prolific source of oil and gas. However, as
President Nixon stated in his message to Congress on June 4, 1971, the
Outer Continental Shelf "has been the source of troublesome oil spills in recent years." Furthermore, this area of the United States could be seriously
harmed and contaminated by the possible oil pollution resulting from all too
frequent oil spills.
337 F. Supp. at 167 (quoting President's Special Message to Congress On Energy
Resources, 1971 PuB. PAPERS 709 (June 4, 1971)).
This comment does not seem to relate to irreparable harm that may immediately
result from denial of preliminary injunctive relief; rather, it appears to refer to the
harm of offshore drilling in general. Since the court explicitly acknowledged the inadequacy of the EIS, but made no attempt to further define the specific irreparable
harm which plaintiffs would suffer from denial of preliminary injunctive relief, the
court may have utilized a Lathan-Scherr type definition of irreparable harm. The
court recognized that there was an "energy crisis" but did not seem to give it much
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The District of Columbia Circuit upheld the district court decision, specifying the importance of including complete discussion
of relevant alternatives in the EIS.9 8 The decision recognized that
this discussion is necessary before a project is allowed to proceed.9 9 However, the court also recognized the difficulty of discussing every possible alternative:
[Tihe requirement in NEPA of discussion as to reasonable
alternatives does not require "crystal ball" inquiry. Mere administrative difficulty does not interpose such flexibility into the requirements of NEPA as to undercut the duty of compliance "to
the fullest extent possible." But if this requirement is not rubber, neither is it iron. The statute must be construed in the light
of reason if it is not to demand what is, fairly speaking, not
meaningfully possible, given the obvious, that the resources of
energy and research-and time-available to meet the Nation's
needs are not infinite. 10 0
The court's use of this "rule of reason"'' 1 test clarified the extent

to which future events must be taken into account under NEPA.
Some courts that have applied the Natural Resources test have
overstated it. Application of the test in Natural Resources itself
permitted the court to overlook the absence in the EIS of

discussion of fuel alternatives-oil shale, desulfurization of coal,
and geothermal resources, for example-which are undeveloped,
long term solutions to the energy crisis. Thus, on its facts, Natural
weight when balancing the equities. Apparently at that time public concern for energy self-sufficiency had not yet attained the level of intensity reached in subsequent
years. More clarity by the court in specifying the harms to each party would have set
stronger precedent for future offshore oil litigation.
98. The court of appeals declared this to be a "sound construction of NEPA."
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
99. The court stated:
What NEPA infused into the decision-making process in 1969 was a directive as to environmental impact statements that was meant to implement the
Congressional objectives of Government coordination, a comprehensive approach to environmental management, and a determination to face problems
of pollution "while they are still of manageable proportions and while
alternative solutions are still available" rather than persist in environmental
decisionmaking wherein "policy is established by default and inaction" and
environmental decisions "continue to be made in small but steady increments" that perpetuate the mistakes of the past without being dealt with until "they reach crisis proportions."
Id. at 836 (quoting S.R P. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969)).
100. 458 F.2d at 837 (quoting NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976)),
101. Id. at 834.
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Resources established only a limited proposition: When alternatives

are neither germane to discussion of a proposed project, nor possible to discuss effectively at the time the EIS is filed, the "rule of

reason" is the yardstick by which courts must measure the adequacy of the EIS. Yet some courts have applied this test to find no
NEPA violation where alternatives are not only capable of

discussion, but perhaps essential to meaningful evaluation of an
EIS.10 2 The test was not intended to pardon exclusion of discussion

of relevant and ready alternatives that might require project
delays-witness the District of Columbia Circuit's ultimate holding in
Natural Resources. 103
Although Natural Resources set strong precedent for requiring
discussion of alternatives in an EIS, neither the district nor appel-

late court established an appropriate method for determining
whether to issue preliminary injunctions at the lease sale stage.

Half a decade later, at a time of increased energy awareness, the
same circuit in a similar case refused to enjoin the scheduled lease
sale.
Alaska v. Kleppe:
Giving Weight to the Need for Energy

In Alaska v. Kleppe, 104 plaintiffs sought preliminary relief to
enjoin an oil and gas lease sale in the Northern Gulf of Alaska, contending that (1) the EIS was insufficient to support the Secretary's

decision to lease and (2) the sale should be delayed pending further
environmental research and studies.' 0 5 The district court held that
102. In County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1238 (1978), for instance, the EIS discussed the possibility of
transporting oil via pipelines. However, it did not thoroughly discuss or properly
weigh objections to that mode of transportation; nor did it explore risks involved in
tankering, the alternative means of transportation which would have to be adopted if
these objections were successful in preventing the use of pipelines. The court found
that the limited discussion of transportation risks in the EIS was "reasonable," since
a second EIS at a later stage would include a more accurate discussion of these risks.
However, the court chose to ignore that the failure to include these risks in the first
EIS weakens the assumptions made about modes of transport. Such an -exclusion
would not have been so "reasonable" under a stricter interpretation of the test.
103. The court found that certain alternatives, such as elimination of oil import
quotas, were relevant and concluded that a failure to discuss them constituted an infraction of NEPA. 458 F.2d 834.
104. 6 ENvIR. L. REP. (ELI) 20479 (D.D.C. 1976) (order denying preliminary
injunction). The merits of the case are discussed in the permanent injunction proceedings reported at Alaska v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1497 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. Alaska v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted,
vacated in part and remanded, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1978) (No. 78-40).
105. 6 ENvIR. L. REP. (ELI) at 20480.
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plaintiffs had failed to establish that the EIS was inadequate or that
an improper cost-benefit analysis had been made by the Secretary. l'6 Thus, plaintiffs had not demonstrated substantial likelihood of success on the merits and were denied preliminary
injunctive relief' 0 7 Even though the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the Council on Environmental Quality recommended delaying the sale,' 08 the court upheld the Secretary's finding that the prospects of substantially increasing the nation's domestic energy supply outweighed possible adverse environmental and
socioeconomic impacts. The District of Columbia Circuit denied
plaintiffs' motion to delay the lease sale pending appeal;' 0 9 plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their appeal and returned to the district
court seeking a permanent injunction. The district court again
denied relief,"i0 and plaintiffs appealed."'
The permanent injunction proceedings in Alaska demonstrate
the necessity of a preliminary injunction to assure that the economic consequences of leasing do not prevent adequate implementation of environmental alternatives. On appeal, plaintiffs argued
that "the environmental hazards and uncertainties of drilling in the
Gulf of Alaska could have been substantially mitigated by the inclusion of 'termination clauses' in the leases sold by Interior. "112 They
concluded that such termination clauses in the leases constitute
" 'an alternative to the proposed action' that should have been considered by the Secretary and evaluated in the EIS.""13 The court
of appeals agreed," 4 but refused to invalidate the leases or insert
termination clauses because of the "grave legal tangles stemming
from the impairment in the value of the leases" and the problem of
"determining appropriate compensation for this impairment."11 5
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The reasons for urging delay included: (1) to permit preparation of adequate operating orders for the Gulf of Alaska, (2) to further progress in state coastal
zone planning, and (3) to complete environmental baseline and other studies. Id.
109. See 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1497.
110. Alaska v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1497 (D.D.C. 1976), affd sub nom.
Alaska v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted, vacated in
part and remanded, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1978) (No. 78-40).
111. Alaska v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Gas. 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
112. 11 Envir. Rep. Gas. 1321, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
113. Id.
114. The court noted that "termination clauses would mitigate the irrevocability of a decision to conduct a lease sale, and would thus reduce, at least to some extent, the risk of proceeding with a sale on the basis of incomplete environmental
data." Id. at 1336.
115. Id. at 1338.
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The problems involved in terminating the lease--adding clauses
and compensating lessees-would never have arisen if a preliminary injunction of the sale had been granted when it was first requested.
Certain alternatives are foreclosed if a lease sale is permitted
before detailed assessment of environmental impact is considered.
Preliminary injunctions are designed to insure consideration of all
alternatives and to prevent their foreclosure until permanent injunction litigation is concluded. The improper balancing of criteria
made by the district court in Alaska prevented implementation of
preliminary injunctive relief at the leasing stage; this foreclosed a
viable alternative, the inclusion of termination clauses, that had not
been considered at the preliminary injunction proceedings.
New York v. Kleppe:
A Suitable Balancing of CriteriaOverruled
New York v. Kleppe"i 6 had a long, complicated legal history
which involved preliminary and permanent injunction proceedings. 1 17 The district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction,
and the Second Circuit's stay of the injunction and ultimate reversal of the decision will be the primary subjects of this analysis.
The case was brought in the Eastern District of New York before Judge Weinstein. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent a lease sale from taking place in the Baltimore Canyon
Trough region of the Atlantic Ocean," i8 contending in part that the
EIS written for the lease sale was inadequate."i 9
The district court held that one glaring inadequacy in the EIS
warranted granting the preliminary injunction: The EIS failed to
discuss the extent to which state regulations would affect how the
oil would be transported to shore.' 20 The EIS assumed that pipelines would probably be used to transport oil ashore for refining
116. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1769 (E.D.N.Y.) (order granting preliminary injunction),
stay granted, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1793 (2d Cir.), stay affd, 429 U.S. 1307, order
granting preliminary injunction rev'd, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1794 (2d Cir. 1976), permanent injunction granted, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1798 (E.D.N.Y.), reo'd sub nom.
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1238 (1978).
117. The permanent injunction litigation can be found at New York v. Kleppe,
9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1798 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of
Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1238 (1978).
118. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1771-72.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1790.
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because of their economic and environmental advantages.

121

How-

ever, placing pipelines within three miles of shore is subject to
state approval; 1 22 plaintiff therefore contended that state regulation

would influence how and at what cost oil would be transported.' 2 3
The court concluded that without discussing these factors, the costbenefit analysis in the EIS with respect to pipeline costs and environmental harm was inadequate, constituting a violation of
NEPA.12A Judge Weinstein granted the preliminary injunction,
finding that the NEPA violation alone amounted to sufficient proof

of irreparable harm' 25 and that delaying the lease sale would do lit121. See id. at 1786; see also New York v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at
1808-10 (permanent injunction proceedings).
122. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311 (1970).
123. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1786. The district court asserted:
Off-shore development will have substantial on-shore impacts. Planning for
land use and provision for meeting the needs of people who will be moving
to new job sites is a responsibility primarily of the states and local governments, most of which have just begun to consider the implications of these
new developments. Cooperation among federal, state and industry groups is
essential.
Id. at 1770-71. See generally Sinclair, Offshore Mineral Resource Exploitation: The
State and Federal Response, 1 Sea Grant L.J. 385 (1976).
Plaintiffs also argued that delaying the lease sale was necessary until management plans required by the Coastal Zone Management Act (the CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§
1451-1464 (1976), were instituted by the states. It was contended that this state
planning might "negate some of the primary assumptions upon which the Secretary
of the Interior based his decision to proceed with leasing." 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at
1779. The district court held that while the Secretary "would have been justified in
putting off a decision to lease for production, permitting exploration and state
planning to go forward in consonance with the spirit of the 1976 amendments to the
Management Act," id. at 1784, the CZMA did not require him to do so. Id. at
1784-85.
The CZMA has given states an effective substantive veto power over Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) development, but not over the leasing phase of the project.
Shaffer, OCS Development and the Consistency Provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act-A Legal and Policy Analysis, 4 Ohio N.L. Rev. 595, 607-14 (1977).
Even though the Secretary of the Interior is not bound by the CZMA at the leasing
stage, he is subject to state veto power (once state plans are approved) at other stages
of offshore development. Thus, a clearer understanding by the Secretary of state regulations and management plans would be appropriate before making a decision to
lease.
124. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1790-91.
125. Judge Weinstein recognized:
[There is] a substantial body of law which holds that the violation of NEPA
itself constitutes sufficient irreparable harm to require issuance of a preliminary injunction. This harm lies in the fact that, without the injunction, major
federal action significantly affecting the environment will continue without
prior compliance with the careful and informed decision-making process required by NEPA.
Id. at 1792.
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tie damage to the federal government.126
Judge Weinstein acknowledged that the difficulty of restricting
leases once the sale occurs was an important factor in deciding
whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief.'2 7 Since the leases
would be for exploration and production, he noted: "It is entirely
unrealistic to suggest that after lease, production can be entirely
blocked since this would constitute an illegal taking without com28
pensation."'1
In enjoining the sale, Judge Weinstein focused on the purpose
underlying preliminary injunctive relief-to preserve the status quo
until NEPA violations are remedied or until all litigation is concluded. 129 The Judge recognized the commitment of resources that
would begin if oil were found, regardless of whether production
plans were approved by the state or the federal government: 30
For the first time in an offshore oil case, the momentum of resource commitment was considered in evaluating whether to issue
a preliminary injunction; the Lathan-Scherr irreparable harm
standard was applied.' 3 ' Whether or not the merits justified a permanent injunction,' 32 enough substantial issues were raised to bal126. The judge stated:
All expert opinion is agreed that in the foreseeable future the value of hydrocarbons on the OCS can only increase. Moreover, enjoining the August
17 sale does not prevent the government from exploring the OCS oil and gas
potential, either by itself or through leasing or contracting of the exploration
work .... [A] delay in the sale on August 17 of exploration and production
leases will only mean a delay in the ultimate date of production if the government chooses not to pursue one of its other options.

Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court relied on Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir.
1975), which stated: "Congress clearly did not intend to grant leases so tenuous in
nature that the Secretary could terminate them in whole or in part, at will." Id. at
750 (footnote omitted). Union Oil dealt with the Secretary's refusal to allow a lessee
to install an oil platform in the Santa Barbara Channel after the disasterous Santa
Barbara oil spill. Upon reviewing the factors that led to the Secretary's decision, the
Ninth Circuit stated that such factors "amount simply to a weighing of conflicting interests which the Secretary should have undertaken before the lease was granted."
Id. at 751. A preliminary injunction in this instance would have insured a proper
weighing.
129. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
130. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1792. "These [corollary activities] include siting,
construction and operation of platform yards, pipe coating plants and other installations, and land acquisitions for new or expanded refineries. This commitment of resources is of the precise sort that should not take place before compliance with
NEPA." Id.
131. Id. See note 125 supra.
132. After the Second Circuit reversed the order granting the preliminary in-
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33
ance the equities clearly in favor of granting temporary relief.
Judge Weinstein wisely recognized the potential irreparable
injury which can accompany a lease sale. Unfortunately, this wis-

dom was hidden in an extremely verbose opinion that dealt with issues extraneous to the preliminary injunction proceedings.
By expansively considering the merits, rather than specifically
focusing on issues pertinent to the preliminary injunction determination, Judge Weinstein may have made it easier for the court of

appeals to disagree with and reverse his decision. The immediacy
of the stay proceedings combined with the extreme length of the
district court opinion may have given the court of appeals reason

to ignore Judge Weinstein's decision entirely. In addition, Judge
Weinstein concentrated too heavily on the adequacy of the EIS in
determining whether there was a NEPA infraction, without focusing on how such an infraction causes irreparable harm in off-

shore oil cases. Such discussion would have at least forced the Second Circuit to provide a reasonable explanation for rejecting his

conclusions.
The Second Circuit hastily granted a stay of the preliminary

injunction one day before the proposed sale.13 4 Bids totalling over
1.1 billion dollars were eventually accepted from interested parties. 135 These leasing commitments and huge investments of
junction, plaintiffs returned to the district court seeking a permanent injunction. Not
swayed by the court of appeals decision, Judge Weinstein granted the injunction,
based upon his previous determinations and upon new testimony that was offered.
The court also seemed persuaded by plaintiffs' contention that the Secretary made
his decision in bad faith. (This contention had also been made at the preliminary injunction hearing, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1778-79, but was not acknowledged by the
court.) See 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1820-22. The appellate court remained adamant,
however, and reversed the district court a second time. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1238 (1978). The
court of appeals relied on its requirement that another EIS be written before the production stage. The court held that this would be a more appropriate time to deal effectively with questions concerning transportation and state interference. County of
Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
1238 (1978). The idea of using a second EIS at a later stage is incorporated in the recent Outer Continental Shelf Act Amendments, Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (to be codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.). See notes
193-195 infra and accompanying text.
133. See text accompanying notes 66 & 67 supra.
134. New York v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1793 (2d Cir.), stay affd, 429 U.S.
1307, order granting preliminary injunction rev'd, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1794 (2d Cir.
1976). The district court had made its decision on Friday, August 13, 1976 after an 11
day hearing culminating in a 200 page opinion. Following a weekend recess, the
court of appeals, in a one-half page opinion, granted a stay of the preliminary injunction, thus allowing the lease sale to take place as scheduled the following day.
135. See 9 Envir. Rep. Gas. at 1800 (permanent injunction proceeding).
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money, which strengthened the momentum of the project, were
pointed to by defendants to persuade the court to deny relief in
the permanent injunction litigation. 136 This was precisely the result
which Judge Weinstein had attempted to avoid. The court of appeals should have allowed a delay of the lease sale at least, to provide a careful, less time-pressured review of the case. The date of
the lease sale was arbitrarily chosen; 3 7 it could easily have been
postponed without affecting national or private interests.
The court of appeals did not consider whether NEPA had
been violated; rather it summarily concluded that the lease sale
posed no danger of irreparable harm to plaintiff's interest.138 After
dismissing plaintiff's claim of irreparable harm, the court simply
emphasized that the national interest in relieving the energy crisis
would be damaged by aborting the sale.
The court improperly balanced the equities. Delaying the
lease sale until the litigation was completely settled would have
had a minimal effect on the long range twenty-five year oil development project;' 3 9 immediate implementation of the project could
not significantly alleviate the nation's present energy needs. By allowing the lease sale to take place, the court simply undercut the
0
importance of preliminary injunctive relief.14
Whether a preliminary injunction is granted is a discretionary
decision of the district court. 141 Although Congress has expressly
vested federal appellate courts with jurisdiction to review preliminary injunctive orders,' 42 appellate courts generally will not disturb
a district court's findings.unless an abuse of discretion or clear mis136. Appellants, National Ocean Industries Association, claimed that the lessees of OCS Sale 40 acquired vested rights that could not be disturbed even if the
Secretary had violated NEPA. Brief for Appellant at 65, County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.. 1238 (1978). They
also declared that private interests would suffer if an injunction were issued, because
large sums had been spent on sale 40 and large commitments had been made. Brief
for Appellant at 66-67. Appellants in effect attempted to utilize the momentum created by their destruction of the preliminary injunction in the permanent injunction
litigation. The court of appeals did not specifically deal with these arguments when
it vacated the injunction.
137. Lease sales are determined by the leasing schedule, which is subject to
continual revision by the Department of the Interior. See note 9 supra.
138. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1794.
139. See Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1145 (D. Mass.)
(order granting preliminary injunction), stay denied, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147 (1st
Cir. 1978), preliminaryinjunction vacated, No. 78-1036 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 1979).
140. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
141. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970).
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take of law is demonstrated. 143 The Second Circuit's cursory analysis of the district court decision in Kleppe did not assert that the
lower court had abused its discretion or made a clear mistake of
law. Lacking a complete record, 144 the court of appeals made a de
novo review of the equities involved in granting a stay of the preliminary injunction.
Justice Marshall, Circuit Justice of the Supreme Court, refused to dissolve the stay. He held that the legal issues did not
warrant review by the Supreme Court, adding that the appellate
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the stay."45
Two months after issuing the stay, the Second Circuit officially
reversed the district court. 146 This decision also did not refer to an
error of law or abuse of discretion by the district court. Based on
the same de novo weighing of criteria that was applied in the stay
proceedings, the court maintained that plaintiffs had not established that the sale caused irreparable harm. 147 Furthermore, upon
evaluation of material collected by the Secretary of the Interior,
the court applied the "rule of reason" test and concluded that
doubt had been cast on plaintiffs' probability of success on the merits. 4 8 The materials reviewed by the court included almost 5,000
pages of documents containing "numerous references to the possible lack of State cooperation relative to pipe line location and usage
149
and the alternative use of tankers."'
143. See, e.g., Biderman v. Morton, 507 F.2d 396, 397 (2d Cir. 1974); see also
Leshy, supra note 43, at 671.

144. The court of appeals in its later decision reversing the district court's grant
of preliminary injunctive relief stated that "[tihis issue has now been more fully
briefed and argued and we have been able to review a more complete record." New
York v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1795.
145. New York v. Kleppe, 429 U.S. 1307 (1976). Justice Marshall's refusal to vacate the stay was prefaced by his admission that it is
well established that a Circuit Justice should not disturb, "except upon the
weightiest considerations, interim determinations of the Court of Appeals in
matters pending before it." This is especially true where, as here, I had only
afew hours to review the District Court's 200-page opinion, the briefs of the
parties, and the four-volume EIS, and where I did not have before me-nor
could I have meaningfully considered even if it were here--the voluminous
record compiled in the District Court.
Id. at 1310 (emphasis added) (quoting O'Rourke v. Levine, 80 S. Ct. 623 (1960) (in
chambers)). The time pressure that exists in these situations only magnifies the need
for preliminary injunctive relief until all litigation is settled.
146. New York v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1794 (2d Cir. 1976).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1795.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
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More than "references" were mandated in this situation. A
meaningful discussion and analysis of state provisions was necessary. This would have weakened assumptions made in the EIS and
could have had a direct effect on the outcome of the project. The
"rule of reason" test 50 should have required inclusion of such
discussion.
In determining plaintiffs' lack of probable success on the merits, the Second Circuit failed to utilize its own test for preliminary
injunctive relief.' 5 ' The court never considered whether the questions going to the merits were sufficiently serious "' to make them
a fair ground for litigation.' "152 The sharp difference of opinion between the district court and the Second Circuit should have sufficiently demonstrated that the questions going to the merits were
serious enough to make them a fair ground for litigation. Thus, the
court of appeals went too far in refuting the merits of the case at
this point in the proceedings. The reasonableness of the Secretary's
decision to exclude certain information from the EIS was an issue
to be fully explored during the permanent injunction litigation.
The court of appeal's reversal may have destroyed the first appropriately applied approach to preliminary injunctions in offshore
oil leasing cases. The method of balancing equities, advocated by
the Kleppe district court and developed in this Note, should be followed by other jurisdictions when dealing with offshore oil issues
to assure adequate assessment of the environmental impact of offshore drilling programs. Unfortunately, as the following case illustrates, the Weinstein approach has not yet been revitalized.
Massachusetts v. Andrus:
The Kleppe Legacy
Massachusetts v. Andrus,153 the most recent offshore oil litiga-

tion, involved a challenge to a lease sale scheduled for Georges
Bank, one of the world's richest fishing areas. Plaintiffs contended
that the Secretary of the Interior violated NEPA by preparing an
inadequate EIS and would be violating his duty to preserve and
conserve fishery resources under the Outer Continental Shelf
150. See notes 101 & 102 supra and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247,
250 (2d Cir. 1975); see text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
152. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1829 (quoting Triebwasser & Katz v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1358 (2d Cir. 1976)).
153. 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138 (D. Mass.) (order granting preliminary injunction), stay denied, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147 (1st Cir. 1978), preliminary injunction
vacated, No. 78-1036 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 1979).
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Lands Act (OCSLA) 154 and the Fishery Conservation and Management Act 1 55 if he proceeded with the sale. 156 The district court
upheld plaintiffs' contentions and enjoined the Secretary from ac157
cepting or receiving bids.
A number of factors influenced the court's decision. The
uniqueness of the area, described as a source of "as much as 15
percent of the world's fish protein,"'158 led the court to distinguish
this case from "other cases not involving as important a natural
resouce."' 159 OCSLA, underscored by The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, was found to impose a duty on the Sec60
retary to be the "guardian . . . of fishing in OCS waters.'
The court maintained that such a duty obligated the Secretary to
hold off the lease sale until Congress acted on certain legislation
before it which more clearly defined the rights and obligations of
lessees, lessors, and others affected by oil development in the
area. 161 Furthermore, the EIS was found inadequate because it
154. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
155. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976). Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the
inadequate EIS preparation violates 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1), (3) (1976).
156. 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1139-41.
157. Id. at 1139.
158. Id. at 1140.
159. Id.
160. Id. The court construed the Secretary's duty to protect fisheries from the
language of 43 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), which states: "This subchapter shall be construed in such manner that the character as high seas of the
waters above the outer Continental Shelf and the right to navigation and fishing
therein shall not be affected." Id. (emphasis added).
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976),
which, according to the court, underscored the Secretary's duty to protect fisheries,
states:
It is therefore declared to be the purposes of the Congress in this
[Act](1) to take immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery resources found off the coasts of the United States, and the anadromous species and Continental Shelf fishery resources of the United States ....
(3) to promote domestic commercial and recreational fishing under
sound conservation and management principles.
Id. § 1801(b). The court noted that management plans formulated by the New
England Fishery Management Council under the direction of this Act would be interfered with if the lease sale took place, resulting in immediate irreparable harm.
However, the court's opinion did not specify how the lease sale would cause such
interference or why immediate irreparable harm would result. See 11 Envir. Rep.
Cas. at 1144-45.
161. 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1140. This legislation involved proposed amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, see notes 184-195 infra and accompanying text, which were finally approved on September 16, 1978. The court
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contained an improper cost-benefit analysis of the advantages and

disadvantages of postponement of the lease sale until Congress

acted.' 6 2 The court also found the EIS deficient because it failed
to discuss possible use of the area as a marine sanctuary. 16 3
The direct irreparable harm that could result if relief were
denied was specified in issuing the preliminary injunction. 164 However, the NEPA infraction was not included in assessing possible

irreparable harm to plaintiffs. The court should have applied the
irreparable-harm standard used by the district court in Kleppe.
This approach would have provided a stronger, more unffied justifi-

cation for granting the preliminary injunction.
The Andrus court may have preferred not to rely on this approach since it was rejected by the Second Circuit. Reaching a
decision contrary to the Second Circuit in Kleppe, the Andrus

court merely distinguished its facts from those in Kleppe to find irreparable harm.' 65 The court of appeals decision in Kleppe thus
may have had some adverse impact on the future application of a

Lathan-Scherr irreparable-harm standard in offshore oil cases.
On appeal the First Circuit refused to grant a stay of the preliminary injunction noting that "a judge of the court of appeals may
stay such an injunction on an emergency basis, prior to the court's
claimed that "[in not waiting for this legislation to be enacted, the Secretary has
done less than he should, in my opinion, to preserve the natural resources on the
George's [sic] Bank which he is bound to do." 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1141.
162. Id. at 1144.
163. Id. at 1142. This was a viable alternative under the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34 (1976).
164. The irreparable harm to plaintiffs listed by the court included: (1) the lack
of assurance that the liability funds included in the proposed OSCLA Amendments
(the Amendments), see Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372 § 102(8), 92 Stat.
629 (to be codified in 43 U.S.C. § 1802), would ever be in place and applicable to
this lease sale; (2) a number of considerations important to the New England Fisheries Council in developing an effective management plan would be mooted; (3) the
possibility of exploratory drilling within the year and the potential hazards involved;
and (4) elimination of the possibility of designating this area as a marine sanctuary.
11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1144-45.
165. The court distinguished Kleppe by noting that "there, there was no issue
such as the pendancy of this important Congressional legislation. There, there could
be no irreversible adverse effects of the action proposed to taken by the Secretary
until the period of about three years from the date of the decision .... Here the
damage is imminent ....
" 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1145. These distinctions are not as
pronounced as the district court indicated. The proposed amendments to OCSLA,
while not considered in Kieppe, could as easily have been an issue in that case as in
Andrus. In addition the adverse effects of the increased momentum caused by the
lease sale, regardless of drilling schedules, was an important consideration in both
cases even though ignored by the Andrus court.
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hearing of the appeal, only if it is most clearly manifest that the
lower court acted beyond its authority."' 66 Such an approach,

though contrary to that employed by the Second Circuit in Kleppe,
is proper: There is generally insufficient time available to review
lower court decisions given the time pressure inherent in an im167
pending lease sale.
Public interest played a significant role in the Andrus and
Kleppe decisions. The importance of the Georges Bank fishery constituted an essential factor in the Andrus decision to deny the stay,
while in Kleppe, the energy crisis was of major significance in the
decision to grant the stay. 168 Although the issues and setting of the
two cases are different, the outcome of the two stay proceedings
should have been the same. The importance of braking momentum
and maintaining the status quo, at least until a final decision on the
permanent injunction can be made, should have carried sufficient
weight to warrant relief in both cases.
After the stay proceedings in Andrus,' 69 a full appeal with argument was heard by the First Circuit on March 7, 1978. On September 16, 1978, the long awaited OCSLA Amendments 170 were
enacted. 171 Finally, on February 20, 1979, almost one year after
166. 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1147 (emphasis added).
167. The lease sale in Massachusettsv. Andrus was scheduled for the next day.
It should be noted that the Second Circuit in New York v. Kleppe, 9 Envir. Rep.
Cas. 1793 (2d Cir.), stay affd, 429 U.S. 1307, order granting preliminary injunction
rev'd, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1794 (2d Cir. 1976), granted a stay under similar time restraints, without indicating that these circumstances constituted an emergency.
168. The First Circuit in Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147
(1st Cir. 1978), preliminary injunction vacated, No. 78-1036 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 1979),
concluded:
In sum, when dealing with a resource, such as the Georges Bank fishery, which, as the district court says, 'has taken millions of years to accrue,
and which will be with us for better or worse for untold centuries to come,'
a delay of several months in order to give meaningful judicial consideration
to these questions, seems not unreasonable.
Id. at 1148 (quoting 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1145 (order granting preliminary injunction)). Conversely, the Second Circuit in Kleppe, declared: "The national interests,
looking toward relief of this country's energy crisis, will be clearly damaged if the
proposed sale is aborted." 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1794.
169. Defendants did not appeal the refusal of the stay to the Supreme Court, and
the lease sale was postponed. [1978] 9 ENVR. REP. (BNA) 1499.
170. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (to be codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
171. The parties subsequently submitted supplemental briefs discussing the
effect of this new law on their positions. See Supplemental Brief of PlaintiffsAppellees; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellants; Supplemental Brief for
Intervenors-Appellants.
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the appeal was heard, the First Circuit lifted the preliminary injunction. 172 Thus, the lease sale process has begun again; however,
it will take at least seven months to regenerate the lease sale
mechanism. 173 The extended delay of the lease sale stalled offshore
development until the OCSLA Amendments were implemented.
Having served its primary purpose, the preliminary injunction was
deemed no longer necessary by the First Circuit. 174
172. Massachusetts v. Andrus, No. 78-1036 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 1979). However,
the First Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of a duty on the Secretary of
the Interior to protect the valuable fisheries in the Georges Bank area, concluding,
"[t]here can be no question, however, that [the Secretary's] legal duty embraces a
solemn responsibility to see that the great life systems of the ocean are not unreasonably jeopardized by activities undertaken to extract oil and gas from the seabed." Id.
at 42.
173. Id. at 21.
174. Id. at 23. The court favorably viewed plaintiffs' suggestion that the EIS
contain a discussion regarding the applicability of the Marine Protection, Research
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1976), claiming, "[s]uch a
discussion would focus additional attention upon the question of whether or not
there are any portions of Georges Bank so uniquely valuable that they should be
singled out for this special protective status." Id. at 29. However, the court would
not make a ruling on this issue:
[W]e prefer not to rule on issues of this complexity without a lower court
decision and without a more adequate presentation before us. There is time
for them to be heard as the case continues in the district court. We therefore
leave it open, for future ruling by the district court, whether the [OCSLA]
amendments provide any reason to modify what is our tentative decision,
that the environmental impact statement should be extended to include a
discussion of the marine sanctuary alternative.
Id. at 29 (emphasis added). Even though this alternative remained a clear issue to be
litigated in the permanent injunction proceedings the court refused to maintain the
preliminary injunction, stating:
The emergency that prompted the injunction-the threatened February 1978
sale of leases-has passed. There is presently ample time for inclusion of
such a discussion in the environmental statement, if required, and for the
Secretary to take account of it, prior to a leasing decision .... Injunctive re-

lief is now premature.
Id. at 29-30 (citation omitted).
The court placed much faith in its belief that the litigation would be resolved
within the seven-month period necessary to reestablish a lease sale, asserting: "With
the threat of an imminent sale of leases over, the court can proceed expeditiously to
the merits." Id. at 32. However, the court left open the possibility that the lease sale
could be enjoined by maintaining, "[i]njunctive relief is now premature." Id. at 30
(emphasis added). Thus, the time, effort, and money expended in organizing the new
lease sale could once again be wasted. Restraining the lease sale a bit longer until
the NEPA issue (failure to include marine sanctuaries alternative in the EIS) was resolved would have been a more appropriate solution. The court refused to acknowledge the existence of any irreparable harm that could arise from the distant lease
sale, noting, "To the extent the environmental statement should go into the marine
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Political pressures and changing interests continually interfere
with uniform application of preliminary injunction criteria in offshore oil litigation. Consequently, the requirements for preliminary

injunctive relief in offshore oil cases remain unclear and the success of these cases will continue to be difficult to predict.
THE OCSLA AMENDMENTS OF 1978: POSSIBLE EFFECTS
ON THE UTILITY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
IN OFFSHORE DRILLING LITIGATION

OCSLA, originally adopted in 1953,175 established the federal
176

government's "jurisdiction, control and power of disposition" 177
over the "subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf."
the InteThe Act included a provision authorizing the Secretary of
and gas development. 178

rior to grant leases for offshore oil

Continuing problems of statutory interpretation arose because
of the accelerated offshore leasing program, 179 creating the need for
amendments to regulate this intensified activity. For instance,

courts questioned whether the Secretary could suspend or cancel a
lease for environmental reasons.18 0 This became an important issue
sanctuary alternative, this matter can be pursued in the time remaining before a
fresh sale is attempted-an injunction is not currently needed to ward off any
threatenedirreparableharm." Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
After a long delay the court finally reached its decision at the time of an impending energy crisis. The court asserted, as a primary reason for lifting the injunction,
that the seven months available before leasing provided sufficient time to implement
safeguards and resolve the litigation. However, a more important consideration underlying the court's decision to begin the leasing process probably involved the
threat of an energy shortage, especially when viewed in light of the time required
before leasing could occur and development could begin.
175. Act of Aug. 7, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462.
176. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1953).
177. Id.

178. See id. § 1337.
179. See AD Hoc SELECT COMM. ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 1, at 4.

180. Id. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1953) provides in part:
The Secretary shall administer the provisions of this subehapter relating
to the leasing of the outer Continental Shelf, and shall prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. The Secretary may at any time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he
determines to be necessary and proper in order to provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf, and the protection of correlative rights therein, and, notwithstanding any other provisions herein, such rules and regulations shall apply
to all operations conducted under a lease issued or maintained under the
provisions of this subchapter.
Id. (emphasis added). Questions arose whether this provision gave the Secretary the
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in preliminary injunction proceedings, because whether there is an
"irreversible commitment of resources" often depends on whether

the lease can be terminated.18 ' Some courts determined that eminent domain proceedings could be used as a last resort if leaseholds had to be taken for environmental reasons.18 2 Questions also
arose concerning the necessity of an EIS at each stage of an oil development project.' 8 3 The Amendments were specifically devised

to solve these and other problems created by the accelerated offshore oil development program. 184

power to cancel leases. For courts' interpretations of this subsection, see County of
Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1381 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 1238 (1978); Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1975);
Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, 12 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1129 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
181. See, e.g., New York v. Kleppe, 429 U.S. at 1312 (in chambers) (affirming
stay of preliminary injunction).
182. See, e.g., Alaska v. Kleppe, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1321, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
183. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d at 1377.
184. The Amendments provide in part:
Sec. 102. The purposes of this Act are to(1) establish policies and procedures for managing the oil and natural
gas resources of the Outer Continental Shelf which are intended to result in
expedited exploration and development of the Outer Continental Shelf in order to achieve national economic and energy policy goals, assure national
security, reduce dependence on foreign sources, and maintain a favorable
balance of payments in world trade;
(2) preserve, protect, and develop oil and natural gas resources in the
Outer Continental Shelf in a manner which is consistent with the need (A)
to make such resources available to meet the Nation's energy needs as rapidly as possible, (B) to balance orderly energy resource development with
protection of the human, marine, and coastal environments, (C) to insure the

public a fair and equitable return on the resources of the Outer Continental
Shelf, and (D) to preserve and maintain free enterprise competition;
(3) encourage development of new and improved technology for energy
resource production which will eliminate or minimize risk of damage to the
human, marine, and coastal environments;
(4) provide States and through States, local governments, which are impacted by Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas exploration, development, and
production with comprehensive assistance in order to anticipate and plan for
such impact, and thereby to assure adequate protection of the human environment;
(5) assure that States, and through States, local governments, have
timely access to information regarding activities on the Outer Continental
Shelf, and opportunity to review and comment on decisions relating to such
activities, in order to anticipate, ameliorate, and plan for the impact of such
activities;
(6) assure that States, and through States, local governments, which are
directly affected by exploration, development, and production of oil and natural gas are provided an opportunity to participate in policy and planning
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The Power to Cancel Leases
The power of the Secretary to prescribe rules and regulations
and to "amend such rules and regulations as he determines to be
necessary and proper in order to provide for the prevention of

waste and conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf,"'18 5 has recently been amended to include the right to

suspend or cancel leases under certain conditions.'

86

Cancellation

decisions relating to management of the resources of the Outer Continental
Shelf;
(7) minimize or eliminate conflicts between the exploration, development, and production of oil and natural gas, and the recovery of other resources such as fish and shellfish;
(8) establish an oilspill liability fund to pay for the prompt removal of
any oil spilled or discharged as a result of activities on the Outer Continental Shelf and for any damages to public or private interests caused by such
spills or discharges;
(9) insure, that the extent of oil and natural gas resources of the Outer
Continental Shelf is assessed at the earliest practicable time; and
(10) establish a fishermen's contingency fund to pay for damages to
commercial fishing vessels and gear due to Outer Continental Shelf activities.
Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 102, 92 Stat. 629 (to be codified in 43
U.S.C. § 1802).
185. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1953).
186. Section 1334 was amended to include provisions
(1) for the suspension or temporary prohibition of any operation or activity, including production, pursuant to any lease or permit (A) at the request of a lessee, in the national interest, to facilitate proper development of
a lease or to allow for the construction or negotiation for use of transportation facilities, or (B) if there is a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate
harm or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property, to
any mineral deposits (in areas leased or not leased), or to the marine,
coastal, or human environment, and for the extension of any permit or lease
affected by suspension or prohibition under clause (A) or (B) by a period
equivalent to the period of such suspension or prohibition, except that no
permit or lease shall be so extended when such suspension or prohibition is
the result of gross negligence or willful violation of such lease or permit, or
of regulations issued with respect to such lease or permit;
(2) with respect to cancellation of any lease or permit(A) that such cancellation may occur at any time, if the Secretary
determines, after a hearing, that(i) continued activity pursuant to such lease or permit would
probably cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish and
other aquatic life), to property, to any mineral (in areas leased or not
leased), to the national security or defense, or to the marine, coastal,
or human environment;
(ii) the threat of harm or damage will not disappear or decrease
to an acceptable extent within a reasonable period of time; and
(iii) the advantages of cancellation outweigh the advantages of
continuing such lease or permit in force;
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entitles a lessee to receive appropriate compensation. 18 7
Although it may appear that the importance of preliminary
injunctive relief is diminished now that the Secretary has power to
cancel leases, significant questions challenge this contention: (1)

Will the Secretary halt a project that has already started; (2) will
the importance of the project to the national interest combined

with the capital and time already invested ultimately outweigh the
potential harm; and (3) will the compensatory scheme stipulated by
the Act further compel the government to continue the project?
The increasing momentum of a project cannot be controlled

with a legal remedy. Although the Secretary now has the power to
stop a project completely, the conditions created by the progress of
a project will affect the Secretary's decision. Once the lease sale is

granted the momentum created will work against any attempt to
stop the project. A preliminary injunction of the lease sale provides

the only satisfactory remedy to this problem.
The Amendments specifically confirm a lessee's right to receive compensation. Once a lease sale occurs, cancelling all leases
(B) that such cancellation shall not occur unless and until operations under such lease or permit shall have been under suspension, or
temporary prohibition, by the Secretary, with due extension of any lease
or permit term continuously for a period of five years, or for a lesser period upon request of the lessee;
Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 204, 92 Stat. 629 (to be codified in 43
U,S.C. § 1334).
187. Id. The Act further provides:
(C) that such cancellation shall entitle the lessee to receive such compensation as he shows to the Secretary as being equal to the lesser of (i) the
fair value of the canceled rights as of the date of cancellation, taking account
of both anticipated revenues from the lease and anticipated costs, including
costs of compliance with all applicable regulations and operating orders, liability for cleanup costs or damages, or both, in the case of an oilspill, and all
other costs reasonably anticipated on the lease, or (ii) the excess, if any, over
the lessee's revenues, from the lease (plus interest thereon from the date of
receipt to date of reimbursement) of all consideration paid for the lease and
all direct expenditures made by the lessee after the date of issuance of such
lease and in connection with exploration or development, or both, pursuant
to the lease (plus interest on such consideration and such expenditures from
date of payment to date of reimbursement), except that (I) with respect to
leases issued before the date of enactment of this subparagraph, such compensation shall be equal to the amount specified in clause (i) of this
subparagraph; and (II) in the case of joint leases which are canceled due to
the failure of one or more partners to exercise due diligence, the innocent
parties shall have the right to seek damages for such loss from the responsible party or parties and the right to acquire the interests of the negligent
party or parties and be issued the lease in question.
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may be extremely costly. The lessee can collect the lesser of either
(1) the fair value of the cancelled rights as of the date of cancellation (taking into account anticipated costs and revenues) or (2) that
amount of consideration paid for the lease and expenditures made
in connection with exploration and development not offset by the
lessee's revenues from the lease, plus interest from the date of receipt to the date of reimbursement.188
The interest expenses arising under the second alternative
may be considerable. 189 The interest paid on the bonus money
held and used by the government can be viewed as interest paid
on a loan.190 However, expenditures made by the lessee in connec188. Id. Consider the following example, which simplifies an ordinarily more
complex calculation that would include numerous additional factors in determining
the fair value of cancelled rights:
Lessee pays $1,000,000 in bonus money for a lease and spends an additional
$500,000 in exploration expenses. Oil is found, with an anticipated value of
$20,000,000. Anticipated costs amount to an additional $5,000,000. Before production
begins, a probable environmental impact is found and the government suspends and
ultimately cancels the lease.
Under alternative 1:
$1,500,000 is spent by lessee
Anticipated revenues ...................................
$20,000,000
5,000,000
Less anticipated costs ..................................
Total, fair value of cancelled rights ....................
15,000,000
Under alternative 2:
Bonus payment spent by lessee .........................
Plus exploration expense ...............................
Subtotal .............................................
Less revenue ..........................................
Total, excess .......................................

$1,000,000
500,000
1,500,000
0
1,500,000
plus interest
Interest is measured from the day of payment to the day of reimbursement. See note
187 supra. Since reimbursement takes place at cancellation, and cancellation takes
place five years after suspension (unless shorter period is requested by lessee), see
note 186 supra, a minimum of five years interest will accrue on the lessee's
$1,000,000 bonus payment, and there will be a number of years interest on the exploration expenses. As the amendments do not specify the interest rate, the added
payment cannot be accurately predicted. Whatever the interest payment would be,
alternative 2 would involve the lesser payment even though interest could be considerable.
If oil were not found, the right to develop the area would be worthless. The government would be relieved of liability and the lessees would be stuck with their bad
investment.
A problem arises in determining the fair value of cancelled rights before exploration begins. Presumably, alternative2 would govern since anticipated revenues under alternative1 would be impossible to accurately determine at this stage.
189. See id.
190. Whether such a loan is needed by the government can, of course, be questioned.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss2/10

64

19791

ENJOINING
OFFSHORE Cohabitation
DRILLING
Komitor: Alimony
Modification:
of Ex-Wife with Another Man

tion with exploration and development will not be capital held by
the government; reimbursement of these expenditures plus interest
will be extraordinarily costly.'19
A preliminary injunction issued prior to the lease sale would
alleviate the expense of compensation. Risking such costs, rather
than delaying a short time to insure proper environmental assess192
ment, does not make good "business sense."'
Requirement of a Second EIS at the Development Stage
The Amendments require a second EIS at the development
stage of the offshore oil project. 193 Deficiencies in the first EIS due
to lack of information, may now be corrected at the development
stage if more information has become available through exploration. A preliminary injunction at the leasing stage would impede
formation of this second EIS. Thus, in cases where a proper assessment could be made only after further exploration, granting such
relief appears counterproductive.' 94 However, even in these cases,
preliminary injunctive relief serves an important function.
The convenience of a second, more informed EIS may cause
decisionmakers to invest less time in preparing the first statement.
Rather than make numerous predictions, decisionmakers may prefer to wait for "the real facts" to become available at the second
stage of the project. However, the possibility of a development
EIS should not undermine the importance of stopping a project because of an inadequate EIS at the leasing stage. Decisions made at
this initial stage are crucial, if only because they are easier and less
pressured given the relative lack of project momentum at this
point. One commentator recently noted:
[A]lthough the second environmental impact statement would
reflect fuller information than the first, its effect on development
191. Exploration expenditures reimbursed by the government could be
interpreted as expenses that the government would have had to spend in any event
to assess the resource capacity of the area. Viewed in this light, governmental reimbursement does not seem as disadvantageous as it otherwise might.
192. A proper environmental assessment at the leasing stage lessens the likelihood of the lease being cancelled in the future. There is little chance that a delay in
the lease sale will affect bidding on the tracts. As long as the area has a high oil potential, developers will be eager to invest. However, by leasing too soon, the government risks paying tremendous compensatory expenses if cancellation is later deemed
necessary.
193. Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 25, 92 Stat. 629 (to be codified
in 42 U.S.C. § 4321).
194. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1238 (1978). See notes 102 & 132 supra.
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Having sold the lease rights, contracted for continuing revenue from production, and negotiated
an acceptable production plan, the Secretary would have little
probably would be small ....

incentive to make major changes in the plan based upon an im1 95
pact statement's negative conclusions.

In sum, at first glance the Amendments appear to minimize
the need for preliminary injunctive relief by giving the Secretary
authority to cancel leases and by requiring a second EIS at the developmental stage. However, a preliminary injunction is still the
only way to stem effectively the momentum that builds as a project
proceeds. The Amendments should thus be used to supplement,
rather than replace, preliminary injunctive relief, thereby insuring
that a complete, proper environmental assessment is made.
CONCLUSION

The role of preliminary injunctive relief in offshore oil litigation under NEPA should not be ignored by courts because of eagerness to accelerate offshore oil development. The goal of energy
self-sufficiency will not be sacrificed by delaying the leasing process. A proper, detailed, environmental assessment designed to safeguard those unexplored regions containing indefinite resources of
marine life should take place prior to any offshore leasing activity.
The courts must reverse the retrogressive trend begun by the
Second Circuit in New York v. Kleppe. 196 That hasty decision has
deprived subsequent litigation of Judge Weinstein's well-conceived
guidelines for granting preliminary injunctive relief in offshore oil
cases. Subsequent decisions thus may return to the unspecific
standards set forth in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton.19 7 The Weinstein approach, as developed in this Note,
captures the letter and spirit of NEPA and should be utilized in future offshore oil litigation.
Robert I. Komitor
195. Cole, The Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1976: An Inadequate Guide to Outer Continental Shelf Development, 14 Harv. J.
Legis. 358, 385 (1977) (footnote omitted).
196. 9 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1793 (2d Cir.) (preliminary injunction stayed), stay
affd, 429 U.S. 1307, order granting preliminary injunction rev'd, 9 Envir. Rep. Cas.
1794 (2d Cir. 1976).
197. 337 F. Supp. 170 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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